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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three chapters in international trade and the economics of 
conflict. These chapters are put together according to two dimensions. From the international 
relations dimension, Chapter 1 analyzes free trade, which is the most “liberal” form of 
international relation; Chapter 2 analyzes different types of trade agreements, which is the most 
common and “moderate” form of international relation; and Chapter 3 analyzes conflict, which is 
the most violent and “extreme” form of international relation. From the proximity dimension, 
free trade usually occurs between countries that are far from each other, trade agreements usually 
signed by countries with in a region, and conflict usually happens between two very close 
countries. 
Chapter 1 develops a novel model of international trade in which transportation costs are 
driven by trade imbalance of an individual country. This task is accomplished by assuming a 
representative transportation firm in each country that competes with its counterparts from other 
countries for international operation. The model of trade imbalance driven costs complements 
results from traditional international trade model in that it sheds light on how trade costs are 
affected by country size. With multiple countries and a continuum of production firms in each 
country under monopolistic competition, we derive an index of transportation costs to capture 
bilateral trade barriers for country pairs. This index is time-variant, which makes it suitable for 
panel data studies. Based on the index, simulation and simplified three-country free trade model 
show that countries with a relatively larger size incur a trade deficit while smaller size implies a 
trade surplus under free trade. A gravity equation is derived and estimated using Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood. Estimation results support the fitness and robustness of the theoretical 
model of trade using the constructed transportation cost index. Further, statistical test shows that 
this transportation cost index is a better approximation of bilateral trade cost than distance. 
A growing number of recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) have introduced 
provisions concerning cross-border investments.  Likewise, a substantial number of RTAs have 
been preceded by agreements regarding cross-border investments. In Chapter 2, we develop a 
partial equilibrium three-country model to examine the relationship between RTAs and FDI 
while also allowing for double taxation.  Our analysis shows that the formation of an RTA 
  
between two regional countries with wage asymmetry is welfare-improving for the low-wage 
country and the region, but can be welfare-deteriorating for the high-wage country.  We extend 
our analysis to examine the role of repatriation taxes in the determination of firm location when 
an RTA is and is not established.  Our final result suggests that the signing of an RTA would not 
induce the relocation of a plant from the high-wage country to the low-wage country unless a 
reduction of the repatriation tax rate also occurs. 
In Chapter 3, we attempt to resolve the “inefficiency puzzle of war” by developing a 
general equilibrium model of bargaining and fighting with endogenous destruction. In the 
analysis, we consider the scenario that two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid 
fighting when there are direct costs (e.g., arms buildups) and indirect costs (e.g., destruction to 
consumable resources) of conflict. Taking into account different modes of “destruction 
technology” (in terms of weapons’ destructiveness) without imposing specific functional form 
restrictions on conflict technology and production technology, we characterize their interactions 
in determining the Nash equilibrium choice between fighting and bargaining. We find that 
bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for 
guarding their settlement through bargaining (but under the shadow of conflict) than in the event 
of fighting. Contrary to conventional thinking that bargaining is Pareto superior over fighting, we 
show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the Nash equilibrium choice. The 
positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting, strikes, international conflict, 
and wars without incomplete information or misperceptions. 
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Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three chapters in international trade and the economics of 
conflict. These chapters are put together according to two dimensions. From the international 
relations dimension, Chapter 1 analyzes free trade, which is the most “liberal” form of 
international relation; Chapter 2 analyzes different types of trade agreements, which is the most 
common and “moderate” form of international relation; and Chapter 3 analyzes conflict, which is 
the most violent and “extreme” form of international relation. From the proximity dimension, 
free trade usually occurs between countries that are far from each other, trade agreements usually 
signed by countries with in a region, and conflict usually happens between two very close 
countries. 
Chapter 1 develops a novel model of international trade in which transportation costs are 
driven by trade imbalance of an individual country. This task is accomplished by assuming a 
representative transportation firm in each country that competes with its counterparts from other 
countries for international operation. The model of trade imbalance driven costs complements 
results from traditional international trade model in that it sheds light on how trade costs are 
affected by country size. With multiple countries and a continuum of production firms in each 
country under monopolistic competition, we derive an index of transportation costs to capture 
bilateral trade barriers for country pairs. This index is time-variant, which makes it suitable for 
panel data studies. Based on the index, simulation and simplified three-country free trade model 
show that countries with a relatively larger size incur a trade deficit while smaller size implies a 
trade surplus under free trade. A gravity equation is derived and estimated using Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood. Estimation results support the fitness and robustness of the theoretical 
model of trade using the constructed transportation cost index. Further, statistical test shows that 
this transportation cost index is a better approximation of bilateral trade cost than distance. 
A growing number of recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) have introduced 
provisions concerning cross-border investments.  Likewise, a substantial number of RTAs have 
been preceded by agreements regarding cross-border investments. In Chapter 2, we develop a 
partial equilibrium three-country model to examine the relationship between RTAs and FDI 
while also allowing for double taxation.  Our analysis shows that the formation of an RTA 
  
between two regional countries with wage asymmetry is welfare-improving for the low-wage 
country and the region, but can be welfare-deteriorating for the high-wage country.  We extend 
our analysis to examine the role of repatriation taxes in the determination of firm location when 
an RTA is and is not established.  Our final result suggests that the signing of an RTA would not 
induce the relocation of a plant from the high-wage country to the low-wage country unless a 
reduction of the repatriation tax rate also occurs. 
In Chapter 3, we attempt to resolve the “inefficiency puzzle of war” by developing a 
general equilibrium model of bargaining and fighting with endogenous destruction. In the 
analysis, we consider the scenario that two contending parties engage in bargaining to avoid 
fighting when there are direct costs (e.g., arms buildups) and indirect costs (e.g., destruction to 
consumable resources) of conflict. Taking into account different modes of “destruction 
technology” (in terms of weapons’ destructiveness) without imposing specific functional form 
restrictions on conflict technology and production technology, we characterize their interactions 
in determining the Nash equilibrium choice between fighting and bargaining. We find that 
bargaining is costly as the contending parties always allocate more resources to arming for 
guarding their settlement through bargaining (but under the shadow of conflict) than in the event 
of fighting. Contrary to conventional thinking that bargaining is Pareto superior over fighting, we 
show conditions under which fighting dominates bargaining as the Nash equilibrium choice. The 
positive analysis may help explain the general causes of fighting, strikes, international conflict, 
and wars without incomplete information or misperceptions. 
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Chapter 1 - Transportation Costs and Trade Imbalance: Theory and 
Evidence 
For international shipments, customs authorities often charged duties on the container as well as 
the contents. And then there was the cost of sending emptied boxes back where they had come 
from, which “has always been a heavy handicap to container transport,” Jean Levy, director of 
the French National Railway, admitted in 1948. 
-“The Box” (Levinson, 2006, pp. 32) 
 
 1 Introduction 
 International trade balance being the main concern of economists and policy makers has a 
long history. A handful of theories have explained why and how trade happens1, but it seems that 
not much had been done to examine how trade balance or imbalance affects transportation costs 
and leads to changes in exports and imports. One important role that trade imbalance has on 
trade costs is described by the above quotation. In the extreme case, imagine a country being an 
absolute exporter with no imports. It is arguably true that transportation costs for this country 
would be significantly higher than a country with relatively balanced trade. Containers and other 
facilities of this absolute exporter would travel from home to foreign countries then never come 
back, or come back empty. In either case, it puts extra costs on outward shipments.2 
In the international trade literature, iceberg transportation costs are usually assumed to be 
exogenous and constant. Empirically, distance between two countries’ capital cities is often used 
as the approximation of this symmetric bilateral trade cost. But distance is not a good proxy of 
actual shipping length when at least one of the two trading partners is a big country. Further, 
since distance is time-invariant, such approach prohibits international trade researchers from 
utilizing panel data estimations. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Heckscher (1919), Ohlin (1933), Samuelson (1948), Vernon (1966), Melvin (1968), Vanek 
(1968), Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977), Krugman (1979, 1980), Leamer (1980), Trefler (1995), Conway 
(2002), Melitz (2003). 
2 This is coined by Pigou (1913) as the “backhaul problem.” 
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Further limitation of using distances as a proxy for transportation costs is illustrated in 
Table 1.1. The four sample countries are chosen because distance from China to either US or 
New Zealand is similar, and distance from Colombia to US is significantly shorter than China to 
US. Table 1.1 reports the unit transport costs of two products traded between these four countries 
in 2007, the latest year available from the OECD Maritime Transport Cost (MTC) Database. 
Product 1 in the table is “Footwear, Gaiters and the like, parts thereof” while Product 2 is “Toys, 
games, sports requisites.” 
Table 1.1 Asymmetric Transportation Costs 
Exporter Importer Product 1 Product 2 Distance (km) 
China US 0.4211 0.3902 11207 
US China 0.2126 0.1231 11207 
China New Zealand 0.4705 0.3580 10750 
Colombia US 0.5428 0.4183 3851 
All numbers are unit transport cost (equals to total costs of transportation 
divided by quantities) in US dollars. 
 
Three observations can be drawn from Table 1.1. First, unit costs of shipments between 
two countries are different by directions. This is revealed by the first and second rows of the 
table in which costs from China to US are significantly higher than those from US to China. 
Second, similar distance could result in big differences in unit costs of shipments. This is 
revealed by the comparison between the first and the third rows. Third, unit costs of shipments 
could be higher even for a shorter distance. This is revealed by comparing the first and the fourth 
rows of the table.3 
This paper intends to build a model of international trade to synthesize existing trade 
theories with the second and third observations from Table 1.1. In the model, we allow the 
presence of representative transportation firms. These transportation firms explicitly take into 
account both total trade flows and trade imbalance of different countries when making their 
                                                 
3 In this footnote I present some further heuristic observations on the incompetence of using distance as the proxy of 
trade costs. In an article (http://news.van.fedex.com/intl/mx?node=10291) on May 2008, Juan N. Cento, the 
President of the FedEx Express Latin America and Caribbean Division says, “(OECD) suggests that although 
proximity to the U.S. is a competitive advantage to Latin American…insufficient infrastructure drives up transaction 
and transportation costs, and this impairs Latin America countries’ competitiveness with hot markets like China.” In 
an article titled “The Tormented Isthmus” published in The Economist (April 16-22, 2011), the author says that “it 
can be cheaper to ship goods to the United States from China than from Central America, according to a World 
Bank study.” 
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pricing decisions to compete with each other in the international market. Three key characters of 
the paper should be mentioned. First, distance is not included into the model. This assumption 
leaves observation 1 from Table 1.1 unanswered. Instead, we derive a transportation cost index 
(TCI) to capture bilateral trade costs. This time-variant index is a function of trade imbalance, 
which is endogenously determined by national incomes of trading partners under monopolistic 
competition. Second, unlike Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) who 
assume all supply prices are equal to one, we use the assumption that price index to be equalized 
among countries and normalized to one when deriving the gravity equation under general 
equilibrium framework. The similarity of aggregate prices among different countries is reported 
in Waugh (2010). Third, the theoretical model is tested using bilateral trade flow data between 
countries without relying on the firm level data.4 The empirical results are consistent with the 
theory. 
 To further show how trade imbalance can affect transportation costs and hence trade 
costs, we look at 58 out of 74 countries within my full sample in the OECD MTC Database. For 
container shipments only5, we average unit costs of all products by exporter and year from 1993 
to 2007. The result is an 870-by-1 vector of trade costs, itc . We then run the following 
regression: 
 0 1it it i t itc imb u v       , 
where itimb  is the trade imbalance (in absolute value) of country i at time t, iu  and tv  are 
country and time fixed effects. Regression result shows that 1 0.7811   at 5% significance 
level. This confirms the effect of trade imbalance has had on trade costs. 
While my model leaves the question of asymmetric bilateral trade costs (observation 1 
from Table 1.1) unanswered, it is the intention of Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) and Waugh 
(2010) to build a model and address this aspect of international trade. These papers derive their 
                                                 
4 For studies of international trade using firm level data, see, for example, Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Pavcnik 
(2002). 
5 The use of only 58 countries is due to data availability. Those 16 countries excluded are shown as italic in Table 
A.1 in Appendix A. Data not available for European countries is due to the fact that OECD MTC Database pooled 
15 EU countries together. The reason to only work with container shipping is because container shipping is the most 
common form of seaborne international trade. Other methods such as clean bulk, dirt bulk, and tanker are in general 
lack of observations from OECD MTC. 
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gravity equation for estimation under Ricardian rather than monopolistic competition. As 
described by Waugh (2010) within a three-country framework, Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) 
assume that asymmetric trade costs are contingent to importers such that importing costs of the 
country with highest income (say United States) are the same but importing a good from US has 
lower trade costs for the country with lowest income level. On the other hand, Waugh (2010) 
assumes that these costs to be contingent to exporters such that exporting costs of US are the 
same but exporting a good from the lowest income country to US has a lower trade cost. Both 
approaches fit data significantly better than traditional gravity equation with symmetric trade 
costs although the two specification result in different implication for aggregate price, 
productivity, and income differences. 
Hummels (2007) provides a detailed review on different modes of transportation for 
international shipments as well as their freight rates. He finds that recent development of air 
cargo makes distance a relatively small barrier to trade, which validates my approach of not 
incorporating distance in the model. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) present a comprehensive 
review on trade costs, both internationally and domestically. They conclude that trade costs are 
large and are linked to many different aspects of economies involved. The current study provides 
insights for one of these aspects, namely trade imbalance. Based on a regression result which 
uses ad-valorem freight rate as dependent variable and distance as one of the independent 
variables, Hummels (2001) evaluates coefficients of symmetric trade barrier proxies such as 
distance, common language, and common border reported in existing literature, and finds that 
these variables yield implausibly large implied trade costs. One of the possible explanations is 
that these proxies capture some unknown factors in addition to trade barriers. Hummels (2001) 
also suggests that “import choices are made so as to minimize transportation costs,” which 
justifies the assumption that asymmetric trade costs are contingent to importers as discussed in 
Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002). 
In their efforts to better understand the relationship between transportation costs and trade 
volumes, Baier and Bergsrand (2001) allow for additional transaction costs of international trade 
such as costs of distributing, marketing, and tailoring. They do so by noted that different markets 
for the same product are unlikely to be substituted costlessly. To accommodate such problem, 
they follow Bergstrand (1985) in assuming a constant elasticity of transformation function in 
capturing a country’s international supply. They find that from late 1950s to 1980s, income 
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growth of countries account for 67% of growth of trade while transportation cost declines only 
account for 8%. 
Jacks and Pendakur (2010) argue that the best time period to examine whether 
transportation costs reduction contributed to trade growth is late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth. They use a semiparametric approach to construct a freight rate index to capture 
bilateral trade freight rate. Using data of UK and its trading partners, they find that transportation 
cost reduction virtually contributed nothing to trade growth. 
It should be noted that there are two recent papers analyzing the relationship between 
export and import flows. Kasahara and Lapham (2008) and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) 
develop models at the firm level to examine how productivity might be different when firms 
make decisions on both importing intermediate inputs and exporting final goods. These papers 
assume two fixed costs: one for importing intermediaries and another for exporting. The total 
fixed cost then gets a discount if a firm is both an importer and an exporter. Particularly, 
Kasahara and Lapham (2008) consider firm level productivity and shipping cost heterogeneity. 
Using Chilean firm level data, they find that firms with high productivity and low shipping costs 
tend to self-select into importing intermediaries and exporting. Using Hungarian firm level data, 
Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009) find that imported inputs have large effects on productivity, 
which can be attributed to the complementary effects of these imported inputs with other goods 
in the production process. 
In this paper, we provide a simple model to link imports, exports, and trade costs, hoping 
to contribute to the literature in three aspects. First, the approach to model trade costs, although 
bilaterally symmetric, is not presumably contingent upon importers or exporters as those in 
Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002) or Waugh (2010). Second, unlike Kasahara and Lapham (2008) 
and Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2009), the present model relates exports and imports at the 
aggregate level by stressing that trade imbalance might lead to changes of bilateral trade costs 
and hence affect international trade. Third, unlike Jonkeren et al (2011) that use micro data and a 
reduced-form approach to access the endogeneity of transport prices empirically, we derive a 
structural model and use aggregate data for my estimation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out the theoretical 
model of multiple countries with a continuum of production firms and a representative 
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transportation firm in each country, followed by a simplified three-country model in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the empirical specification and tests the theoretical model using Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood. The last section concludes. 
 2 Theoretical Model 
 There are N countries in the world and these countries can freely trade with each other. 
The population of country i is iL . Each country has two types of firms – a continuum of 
production firms and a representative transportation firm. Production firms can potentially serve 
the domestic market and/or international markets. Consumers and firms in all countries play a 
sequential game. In the first stage, transportation firms determine their shipping prices and bid 
for operation. In the second stage, consumers and production firms make consumption and 
production decisions simultaneously. The model is solved backwardly. 
 2.1 Consumption 
 Assume identical representative consumers with C.E.S. utility function in all countries as 
in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1979), Melitz (2003), and Chaney (2008). The 
representative consumer of country i maximizes utility 
   11i yyU q       
subject to the budget constraint 
 y y iy p q I , 
where yp  and yq  are respectively price and quantity demanded of good y,   is the constant 
elasticity of substitution between any two good, and iI  is the income of consumer i. As is well-
known, in equilibrium, 
   1iy y iq p I P   ,         (1.1) 
where  1 11i yyP p     is the cost-of-living aggregate price index of country i. 
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 2.2 Production 
 In each country, there is a continuum of production firms with each firm only produces 
one product. Follow Melitz (2003), each firm has a sunk cost of entry before it draws a 
productivity level   from a common distribution  g  .   is the constant marginal product of 
labor. If a firm decides to export, there is an additional common fixed sunk cost of exporting to 
each market. Assume the wage rate to be 1. Once a firm is operating/exporting, the variable 
profit of such firm in country j with productivity   is given by 
 d dj j j jp q q f        for domestic sales 
  x xj j ji ji jii ip q T q f       for international sales 
where zjp  ( ,z d x ) is the price of the firm’s product, with superscript d denotes domestic, and x 
international, f  is the fixed cost of operating common to all firms, jiT  is iceberg transportation 
cost common to all products produced in country j. jiT  units must be shipped for 1 unit of 
country j’s product to reach country i, and this rate is to be determined by transportation firms in 
the first stage of the game. Solving for the prices of domestic and international sales, we have 
  1dp

   ,         (1.2a) 
  1
jix Tp

   .         (1.2b) 
 As in Melitz (2003), the free entry condition and the zero-profit condition of exporting 
identify a cutoff level of productivity x , below which firms serve only domestically. Since the 
evolution of productivity is not the concern of this paper, there is no need to solve for this cut-off 
productivity level explicitly. 
 2.3 Transportation 
 There is one representative transportation firm in each country. These transportation 
firms bid on the international market by offering their profit-maximizing prices. Also, each 
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transportation firm is assumed to be able to handle imports to and exports from its home country 
only.6 
 First, define 
   1ii iS L P    
as country size adjusted by cost-of-living price index and call this the adjusted country size. The 
import of country i from country j, which can be derived from equations (1.1) and (1.2b), is 
given by 
 
1 x
ji
ji i
T
q S d



  

              (1.3) 
where 1ji jiT t  , and jit  is the unit shipping price set by the transportation firm handling 
shipments between country i and country j. If we aggregate jiq  over j assuming all countries 
have the same productivity distribution7, and let   denote the integral term in equation (1.3), 
we have the total import of country i equals to 
 
1
jiim
i i j
T
Q S

  
             (1.4) 
for all j i . Also, we can calculate the total export of country j by aggregating jiq  over i, after 
switching subscripts, to get 
 
1
ijex
i jj
T
Q S

  
     .        (1.5) 
 Furthermore, the trade imbalance, in absolute terms, between any trading partners i and j 
is 
                                                 
6 This assumption is theoretically equivalent to the assumption that all ships and containers have to be fully loaded 
and cleared at any port. In other words, I rule out the possibility that shipments from the United States to France be 
partially clearing at UK although UK might be along the route from US to France. 
7 This assumption is maintained throughout the paper. This assumption implies that the model with continuous firms 
is simplified into a version with only two representative production firms in any given country, one serves 
domestically only, and the other serves both domestic and international markets. 
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1
ij
ij ji i j
T
S S

  
     
        (1.6) 
where ij jiT T  in equilibrium. Aggregating equation (1.6) over j, we get the total trade imbalance 
of country i as 
  1i ij i jj T S S
  
        .       (1.7) 
 Assume that each of the representative transportation firms competes for operation in the 
international market by offering a bid that equals to the optimal price it would offer as if the 
representative transportation firm handles all exports from and imports to its home country, 
taking into account trade imbalance. Specifically, profit of the transportation firm in country i is 
given by 
  T T Ti i i it C Q f      , 
where it  is the bid offered by the firm and hence the price charged to international shipments, 
TC  is the constant marginal cost of operating hereafter normalize to 0, and Tf  is sunk cost of 
operation. Both TC  and Tf  are common to all transportation firms, im exi i iQ Q Q   is calculated 
according to equations (1.4) and (1.5),  0   is the marginal inefficiency due to trade 
imbalance, and i  is from equation (1.7). We assume transportation firms bid with no charge. 
Further, assume these firms operate with inputs other than labor (for example, capital) so there is 
no competition between transportation and production firms. Note that with N countries, we need 
either one of the following assumptions: (i) All these countries are locating in an (N-1)-
dimensional Euclidean space with equal distance to each other, or (ii) Freight rates are not a 
function of distance. We rewrite the profit of transportation firm i, after plugging in equations 
(1.4), (1.5), and (1.7), to obtain 
     1 11T Tii i i j i jj jT T N S S S S f

  
                  . 
 Solving for iT  that maximizes 
T
i , we have 
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  * 11 1
i jj
i
i jj
S S
T
N S S


       

  i j  .     (1.8) 
 The shipping price offered by country i’s transportation firm is hence given by * 1iT  . 
Equation (1.8) exhibits the tradeoff between total trade volume and trade imbalance. Note that 
the denominator of the fraction term inside the bracket can be rewritten into  2 i wN S S  , 
where w iiS S , for all i. Thus the denominator is increasing in adjusted country size and the 
adjusted size of the world. The numerator is non-monotonic in the adjusted country size iS , 
given all jS , for all j i . Since the competition between these transportation firms is Betrend 
price competition in nature, *iT  is also the solution that satisfies 0
T T
i f   . In other words, 
once these transportation firms started to operate, they are operating with zero variable profits. 
 Using equation (1.8), we can generate a vector of transportation prices in each year that 
are indirectly related to trade flows around the world. Specifically, define 
 
it jtj
it
it jtj
abs S S
NS S
  

         (1.9) 
as the transportation cost index (TCI) of country i at time t which is positively related to *itT . For 
time t, we can generate this index associated with all countries given data of adjusted country 
sizes. Without loss of generosity, we drop time dimension in the rest of this section. Note that in 
the generation, once the lowest value is calculated, say from country m, mS  should be removed 
and the values of the index change for all countries that remain. Then the second lowest *iT  can 
be calculated. This is a continuous bidding process. The resulting TCI is an N-1 dimensional 
vector. We can further construct an N N  TCI matrix, denoted as  , to determine the 
transportation cost resulting from trade imbalance between country i and country j for any given 
year. If 
  min  for all m i i   , 
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then mj im m     for all i and j. We then find the second lowest i , say i n , and 
hence n j in n     for all ,i j m . This process continues and will result in a N N  matrix of 
TCI at any given year. 
Figure 1.1 Simulation Result with 1000 Draws 
 
  
To illustrate, we generate 1000 random draws from uniform distribution to represent 
adjusted-country-size (ACS) and calculate the TCI and trade surplus/deficit8 of each country 
based on these draws. Results are depicted in Figure 1.1 with ACS plotting increasingly and the 
pseudo value of trade surplus/deficit scaling down by 310 . Three results stand out from Figure 
1.1. First, the lowest TCI occurs in the mid-range of ACS, the 615th from the bottom and the 
value being around 0.5. Repeating the simulation for 1000 times, we find that on average the 
lowest TCI occurs at 618.2280 with a standard error equals to 3.0799. 
                                                 
8 Noting that trade values are positively related to ACS but negatively related to TCI, I use Si ji  to represent 
trade value from country j to country i. 
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Second, the trend of the ACS line and the pseudo trade surplus/deficit line are negatively 
related. Hence, in general, countries with larger ACS suffer trade deficits while countries with 
smaller ACS incur trade surplus. 
Third, the general trend of the pseudo trade surplus/deficit line breaks and jumps upward 
for the country with the lowest TCI. In theory, this can result in either a trade surplus or trade 
deficit depending upon the adjusted sizes of all countries. The next section further uses a three-
country world trade model to show the implication of these three results from simulation. 
 3 Three Country Model 
 Set aside the (N-1)-dimensional Euclidean space assumption, for a world with only three 
countries, the current model shows that when the three countries are of equal distance to each 
other, the transportation costs can be different, which is conform with observation 2 in Table 1.1. 
This model also implies that, transportation costs, or more generally the bilateral trade costs, can 
be lower even with longer distance, which is conform to observation 3 in Table 1.1. These 
features are significantly different from traditional trade models which assume constant iceberg 
transportation costs and use distance as the proxy. In this section, we use a three-country model, 
with the assumption that they are of equal distance to each other and A B CS S S  , to analyze 
the implication of the proposed new model of international trade. 
 First, defining W A B CS S S S   , we have from equation (1.9) that for each country 
 2 A B CA
A W
S S S
S S
    ; 
A C
B
B W
S S
S S
   ; 
2A B C
C
C W
S S S
S S
    . 
 These values lead to the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1.1. In a three country world with transportation costs resulting from trade 
imbalance, the representative transportation firm in country with medium adjusted size offers the 
lowest price. 
To prove, first note that B  has a bigger denominator and a smaller numerator than C  
hence B C   . Also, we have 
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  
  
2
0A B B CA B
A W B W
S S S S
S S S S
      , 
which completes the proof of the proposition. Proposition 1.1 indicates that the representative 
transportation firm in country B, the country with medium adjusted size, handles all world trade 
except for those between country A and country C. This is the special case of the first result from 
the simulation presented in Figure 1.1. 
With only three countries, we determine the second lowest TCI as 
 A CA C
A C
S S
S S
      . 
Due to the nature of bilateral trade, prices offered by the transportation firms of country 
A and country C are identical. Without loss of generosity, we pick country A’s transportation 
firm to be the one that operates. We find that B A    since both values have the same 
numerator but B  has a bigger denominator. From equations (1.2b) and (1.4), we derive the total 
value of trade from country j to country i as 
 
1
1
1
ji
ji i
T
V S

 

    
 .        (1.10) 
Based on the assumption that A B CS S S   and that jiT  is positively related to ji , we have 
 AB CBV V ; BA ABV V ; CB BCV V ;       (1.11a) 
CA ACV V ;          (1.11b) 
BA CAV V ; BC ACV V .         (1.11c) 
 In (1.11a), all jiV  have the same BT , the transportation costs, since all route connected to 
country B using transportation firm in B. As a result, the differences of 'jiV s  only owe to iS . 
Because jiV  is an increasing function of iS  we hence get (1.11a) given that A B CS S S  . 
Similarly, all jiV  in (1.11b) have the same AT . In (1.11c), jiV  of the LHS of the inequality signs 
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has a lower T  and a higher iS , with jiV  being an decreasing function of T . Summarizing all 
these relationships, we reach 
 AC BC AB CB BAV V V V V    .        (1.12) 
 Equations (1.11) and (1.12) permit us to establish the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1.2. In a three country world with transportation costs resulting from trade 
imbalance, after adjusting country size for cost-of-living, the largest country has net trade deficit 
(imports exceed exports) whereas the smallest country has net trade surplus (exports exceed 
imports). 
 Proposition 1.2 is the special case of the result that trade surplus/deficit is negatively 
related to ACS presented in Figure 1.1. One possible reason for the existence of trade deficit of 
large countries is because they tend to consume more, both domestically and internationally, and 
export less. Trade imbalance further raises the transportation costs and worsens trade imbalance 
for these large countries. When cost-of-living is not so different everywhere around the world, 
the size of country can be approximated by real GDP of a country. This explains why United 
States has trade deficit in most of the 20th century and continues so after passing the millennium 
and, at the same time, Ecuador has trade surplus. 
 For the medium country, we calculate its trade balance, defined as exports minus imports, 
using equation (1.10) and get 
       1 12
1
B
BA AB BC CB A C B i
TV V V V S S S S

 

           .   (1.13) 
We thus have the next proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1.3. In a three country world with transportation costs resulting from trade 
imbalance, the country with medium adjusted size can either has a trade surplus or trade deficit 
depending on the size of the three countries. 
 The RHS of equation (1.13) should not be taken quantitatively although it shows that if 
the adjusted size of the medium country is greater than the average of the adjusted size of the 
other two countries, it would have trade deficit, and vice versa. The more general case of 
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Proposition 1.3 was presented in the third result followed Figure 1.1. An application of this result 
is to note that the status of the medium country’s trade account can evolve over time. 
 4 Empirical Model 
 To empirically test the theory, ideally one can follow the literature on demand system 
analysis to use the Almost Ideal Demand System developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) or 
its variations. This strand of literature provides insights about the relationship between price and 
quantity demanded. But for internationally trading commodities, quantity measures could differ 
for the same product traded. On the other hand, even with value and quantity data in hand, the 
calculated prices using value-divide-quantity is often unreliable. First, one has to be cautious 
about whether the calculated price is the price that the exporter sold to the importer, or that the 
importer sold to consumers. Second, when this exercise is performed on the data described by 
Feenstra et al (2005), the price variation can be dramatic on the same product for the same 
exporters and importers in consecutive years. 
We hence follow the tradition in the international trade literature by using trading values 
as the dependent variable. Note that when specialized transportation firms are handling 
shipments, they can combine shipments from different industries. As a result, we can focus on 
total value traded instead of values by industry. As in Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1998), and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), a gravity equation can be derived from a typical C.E.S. 
utility preference under general equilibrium. To save space and without confusion, we drop   
and   in this section. 
 4.1 Gravity Equation 
From equation (1.1), one can derive 
  11 iy y iv p P I  , 
as the value spent on product y by the representative consumer of country i. The total value from 
country j to country i can thus be written as 
    1 1d iji ji j iV T p P I   .        (1.14) 
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where djp  is the domestic price of product from country j that also sold internationally. Summing 
over subscript j, we get the total importing value of country i as 
    1 1im i di i ji jjV P I T p    ,       (1.15) 
while summing over i and switching subscript gives the total exporting value of country i as 
    1 11ex d ji i ji jjV p T P I    .       (1.16) 
Note that by definition, 
     11 1 1i d di ji jjP p T p         . 
Thus equation (1.15) can be rewritten as 
    1 1im i di i i iV I P p I    .        (1.17) 
General equilibrium requires im exi iV V .9 Using equations (1.16) and (1.17), we have 
        1 1 1 11i d d ji i i i ji jjI P p I p T P I         .     (1.18) 
Solving for dip , we get 
       11 1 11d i ji i ji j ijp P I T P I I          .     (1.19) 
 Rewrite equation (1.14) for the value from country i to country j, and substituting in 
equation (1.19), we get 
 
   
   
11
1 11
j
ij
ij i ji j
i ij jj
T P
V I I
P I T P I

 

 

 .      (1.20) 
                                                 
9 One might notice the difference between the partial equilibrium framework in the earlier section of this paper and 
the general equilibrium (GE) framework here. These two frameworks can be reconciled by assuming the existence 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and financial assets demanded by representative consumers in each country. 
Specifically, conditions under GE might imply all countries have the same size (in terms of GDP), but this is not 
necessary the case with FDI. On the other hand, GE requires no country has trade imbalance at the aggregate level. 
Under general equilibrium, the existed trade imbalance will be even out by financial assets. 
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 Equation (1.20) is the gravity equation used for estimation later. It shows that trading 
values between any two countries are positively related to the size of the two countries ( iI  and 
jI ), and negatively related to transportation costs ( ijT ). The denominator of the fraction term in 
equation (1.20) can be considered as either multilateral resistance as in Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2001, 2002), and Waugh (2010), or a measure of the 
remoteness of country i similar to that of Chaney (2008). 
 4.2 Estimation 
From here, we assume 1iP   for all i. This assumption is consistent with Observation 3 
reported in Waugh (2010, pp.2101) which states that “aggregate tradable goods prices are similar 
between rich and poor countries.” Such simplified assumption allows me to use GDP as the 
proxy of the adjusted country size to construct the transportation cost index (TCI). It also makes 
it convenient to estimate the model using equation (1.20). 
 Making use of the assumption that 1iP  , we can divide both numerator and 
denominator of the RHS of equation (1.20) by  11     and obtain 
 
   
 1 1
1 ln 1 ln ln
exp ,1ln 1
ij i j
ij
i j ijj
I I
V
I I
 
  
  
 
                      
     (1.21) 
where ij  is the N N  TCI matrix derived in Section 2. Note that we drop time dimension here 
and after whenever there is no confusion. Follow Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), we use 
Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) to estimate the model in equation (1.21). As 
described in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), there are at least two reasons to use PPML 
estimator. First, given the presence of heteroskedasticity in international trade data, NLS 
estimator on equation (1.21) is inconsistent and inefficient. Second, the PPML estimator can 
handle zero values of trade flows, which appear frequently in international trade data, without 
relying on further assumptions. Although the Poisson model is generally being applied in count 
data, it can also be thought as a type of nonlinear regression model with heteroskedasticity. 
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Rewrite the curly bracket term as nX  , where nX  is a vector of independent variables of 
the nth observation, and   a vector of parameters to be estimated. Also, rewrite nV  as the 
dependent variable associated with nX . The log-likelihood function of the PPML estimator, as 
shown by Gourierous, Morfort, and Trognon (1984), is: 
    
1 1
exp
N N
n n n
n n
L V X X  
 
   . 
The final estimation specification of the model is given by 
 
   
 1 1
1 2 3 4
1
11
5 2
1
1 ln 1 ln ln
exp .1ln 1
ij i j
ij
i j ijj
GDP GDP
V
GDP GDP


    
  


                      
    (1.22) 
 In this specification, country i is the exporting country and country j is the importing 
country. ijV  is the total value of trade from country i to country j. 1 5   are parameters to be 
estimated. We expect all of them to be positive except for 5 . Also, by definition, 1  should be 
greater than 1 which makes 11   a negative value. 
 Bilateral trade data is from IMF Direction of Trade (DOT) statistics for 74 countries from 
1993 to 2009. These are exporting values reported in f.o.b. A list of countries is in Table A.1 of 
the Appendix A, along with the percentage of world exports and imports to and from the sample 
countries (Table A.2). GDP data is from World Bank, in which 2009 is the latest year of non-
estimated data available for all 74 countries at this point. The constructed ij  matrix is available 
upon request. 
We first run the regression based on equation (1.20) in which bilateral trade cost, ijT , is 
augmented and approximated by 
 0 1 2ij ij ijT Dist      . 
 In this augmented specification, ijDist  is distance between country i and j, while ij  is 
given in equation (1.9). This takes into account the fact that bilateral trade costs might be 
affected by both distance and trade imbalance between two trading countries. We expect 1 0  , 
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2 0  , while the sign of 0  is arbitrary. Estimation result is presented in the second column of 
Table 1.2. All parameters have expected signs and are statistically significant from zero except 
for 0  and 1 . This estimation with augmented bilateral trade costs provides positive evidence 
for my approach of estimating equation (1.22). 
Table 1.2 PPML Estimation Results 
Augmented TCI Distance 
Dependent Variable ijV  ijV  ijV  
Constant Elasticity of Substitution ( 1 ) 5.8186** 8.6134** 1.4781** 
(1.2338) (1.7156) (0.1684) 
Marginal Inefficiency of Imbalance ( 2 ) 0.4812** 0.6693** - 
(0.2141) (0.1052)  
Log Exporter's GDP ( 3 ) 0.6196** 0.9339** 1.8590** 
(0.1716) (0.2261) (0.7654) 
Log Importer's GDP ( 4 ) 0.2945** 0.3549** 0.4650* 
(0.0698) (0.0720) (0.2249) 
Multilateral Resistance ( 5 ) -0.4954** -0.8001** -1.8519** 
(0.1502) (0.2045) (0.7111) 
0  0.1703 - - 
(0.2282)  
1  1.3042e-5 - - 
(0.8114e-5)  
2  1.0622** - - 
(0.2031)  
Negative Log Likelihood 0.9253e+8 1.1120e+8 1.7769e+8
Number of Observations 90146 90146 90146 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. The bootstrap procedure takes 1000 observations 
to resample in every iteration and iterates for 1000 times. 
** indicates significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 5%. 
 
In the estimation with only TCI, which is reported in third column of Table 1.2, all 
parameters have the expected signs and value ranges, and all are significant at 1% level. 
Specifically, the value of 1  is significantly greater than 1, which is consistent with the 
theoretical model that a larger TCI is associated with a greater bilateral trade cost ( 11   is 
negative). The positive parameters for GDP of the two countries demonstrate the suitability of 
20 
 
the gravity equation. Last, a negative 5  is consistent with the idea of multilateral resistance of 
international trade. 
 In the fourth column of Table 1.2, we report the estimates when approximating ijT  in 
equation (1.20) using distance between the two trading countries. In such case, we do not have 
2 . All estimates have the expected signs but significantly different in magnitudes compared to 
the model using TCI. Moreover, the negative log likelihood value is significantly larger in the 
case of using distance. Using the non-nested likelihood ratio test proposed by Vuong (1989), we 
find that 267.6951LR   under the null hypothesis that the model using distance is as good as 
the one using TCI. The directional value of LR  rejects the null and indicates the model with 
TCI is the favorable one. 
 4.3 Elasticity and Trade Costs 
The estimates of 3  and 4  in the third column of Table 1.2 are not values of elasticity. To 
calculate the elasticity of trade when there are changes in GDP of exporters and importers, we 
have from equation (1.20) 
 
 
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
3 1
11
2
1
1
ln
ln 1 1
i
ij
EX
i
i j ijj
GDP
V
GDP
GDP GDP



  
  



                 

; 
 
 
 
1
1
1
1
5 2
4 1
11
2
1
1ln
ln 1 1
j ijij
IM
j
i j ijj
GDPV
GDP
GDP GDP



   
  



              

. 
 The calculated value of average (averaging over all counties in all years) elasticity of 
trade volumes with respect to GDP of exporters and importers are 
 .7475EX  ; .3463IM  . 
 These values indicate that the impacts of country sizes on trade volumes are asymmetric. 
Other things being equal, 1% change in GDP of a country is associated with 0.4012% 
( 0.7475 0.3463 ) change in net export. Put alternatively, when China’s GDP grows at 10% 
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annually while US grows at 2.6%, it is predicted from the model that US trade deficit with China 
increases at an annual rate of 2.97% (0.4012×7.4%). However, the actual trade deficit from 
1993 to 2009 increased at an average of 21.2% annually. This reflects that there are other factors 
restraining international trade. Details are reported in Table A.3 in Appendix A. 
 The elasticity of trade when there is change in TCI can be calculated according to 
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. 
The result, after taking average from all countries in all years, is 
 3.6763TCI   .         (1.23) 
 Equation (1.23) has a very interesting explanation. Other things being equal, the value of 
ij  is governed by the trade imbalance of the country (between i and j) that handles shipments. 
When the exporter is the shipment handler, my model and estimation results predict that a 1% 
increase in trade imbalance is equivalent to 4.92 % decrease in the exporter’s GDP, or 10.61% 
decrease in the importer’s GDP. There are large and significant welfare loss due to trade costs 
based on trade imbalance. 
 Last, we calculate the implied average total trade cost from the theoretical model. This 
trade cost is equivalent to prices charged by transportation firms and is given by 1T  . The 
average total trade cost, that is, an average over all countries in all years, is ad-valorem tax 
equivalent of 76.24 percent. This number lies within the range reported in Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2004). 
 4.4 Robustness Checks 
 In this section, we perform two robustness checks on the constructed TCI. First, since the 
theoretical model predicted that, with TCI, higher GDP is associated with higher trade deficit, we 
run the regression 
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    1 2exportln ln lnimportit it it itit GDP  
         
,     (1.24) 
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
  
is calculated according to equation (1.9), 1  and 2  are parameters to be estimated, and we 
expect both of them to be negative. With 74 countries in my sample, i  of each year is a 73-by-
1 vector. Hence the country with the largest value of i  (from US) is dropped. In addition, we 
drop observations when total import or export of a country is zero. As a result, there are 1236 
observations in the sample of this regression. The regression result of equation (1.24) show that 
1 0.076    and 2 1.651   , both at 1% significance level. This hence confirms that when 
using the constructed TCI to explain trade volumes, larger GDP would be correlated with greater 
trade deficit. 
As a second robustness check on the constructed TCI, we follow Limao and Venables 
(2001) and Waugh (2010) to use the fraction of reported c.i.f. values (from the import statistics 
of the IMF DOT) and f.o.b. values as a measure of true trade cost. Specifically, we run the 
regression: 
  0 1 11ij ij ijt              ,      (1.25) 
where ij ij ijt cif fob  is the measure of trade cost from the IMF DOT, the bracket term is the 
implied trade cost from equation (1.8), and 0  and 1  are parameters to be estimated. We expect 
1  to be positive. Follow Waugh (2010), we drop values of ijt  less than 1, which would imply 
negative transportation cost, and 1.1, which was used by IMF to calculate missing values. In 
addition, we drop values greater than 10, as a transportation cost 9 times as large as the values of 
the good is very likely to be a measurement error. This leaves 39030 observations in the sample. 
The correlation between the implied trade cost of the model and ijt  is 0.082. Estimation result of 
equation (1.25) shows a value of 1 1.680   at 1% significance level. The regression result 
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provides positive evidence that the implied trade costs based on my theory and the constructed 
TCI is a very good approximation of real trade costs. 
 5 Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, we have developed a model of international trade in which transportation 
costs are endogenously determined by trade imbalance of a country. The concept of 
transportation costs resulting from trade imbalance implicitly builds the connection between 
export and import flows. Based on the theoretical model, we derived and constructed a 
transportation cost index (TCI) to capture bilateral trade costs of country partners. This index is 
related trade imbalance and is time-variant. 
 We used simulation and a simplified three country model to show how transportation 
costs resulting from trade imbalance affect exports and imports. Simulation and analytical results 
show that representative transportation firm in a country with medium adjusted size offers the 
lowest transportation price and hence handles all trade to and from its home country. As a result, 
larger countries tend to incur a trade deficit. A possible reason for this result is that larger 
countries tend to consume more final goods, both domestically and internationally, but at the 
same time do not have the comparative advantage in becoming the handler of international 
shipments to lower its transportation costs. For the country with the lowest TCI, it escaped from 
the general trend that trade surplus/deficit is negatively related to adjusted country size. 
 Within a general equilibrium framework, we derived the gravity equation to estimate the 
proposed theory. The estimation results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
Specifically, a higher value of transportation cost index as well as a greater multilateral trade 
barriers lower the volume of international trade, while GDP of the exporter and importer have 
positive but asymmetric relationships with trading volumes. 
 One of the caveats of the constructed transportation cost index might be the fact that it 
does not take into account distance, which is often used as bilateral trade barriers in existing 
empirical literature. Although anecdotal evidences suggest that distance might not be an 
adequate approximation for bilateral trade costs, it might still be a good idea if one can 
theoretically and empirically take into account both distance and transportation costs resulting 
from trade imbalance. Another possible direction for future research is to model the competition 
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between production firms and transportation firms and see how that would affect the outcome of 
international trade. 
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Chapter 2 - Tax Policies, Regional Trade Agreements, and FDI: A 
Welfare Analysis 
 1 Introduction 
The last half-century has brought unprecedented growth in the trade in goods and cross-
border capital flows despite the numerous obstacles involved in moving both goods and capital 
across international borders.  Great advances in communications and transportation have 
combined with an ever-expanding array of international agreements to reduce the frictions 
associated with these international transactions.  While regional trade agreements (RTAs) have 
reduced the burden of tariffs on traded goods, agreements have also been established to promote 
cross-border FDI flows.  Recent international agreements such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) have addressed both trade and investment. 10   Likewise, bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) have been established to promote 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  While the influences of both FDI and trade agreements are 
extensively explored as separate concepts in the literature, the joint impact has received much 
less attention despite the fact that a growing number of RTAs address investment.  The primary 
focus of this paper is the examination of the joint impact of FDI and trade agreements on social 
welfare and firm behavior in an environment with potential double taxation.  
Firms seeking to extend its market overseas may choose to enter foreign markets through 
exporting or, alternatively, by way of horizontal FDI.  Many factors can affect this mode of entry 
into foreign markets.  For example, Brainard’s (1997) proximity-concentration trade-off suggests 
that firms will take into account transportation costs and market size when choosing between 
exporting and overseas production.  Similarly, Helpman, et al. (2004) show that firms of the 
highest productivity levels will enter foreign markets by way of horizontal FDI, whereas 
relatively less productive firms are more likely to serve foreign markets by exporting.  
Alternatively, Yeaple (2003) finds that U.S. FDI flows are driven by a complex interaction of 
labor endowments and the skill intensity of the industry.  He notes that his results suggest that 
                                                 
10 In particular, Chapter 11 of NAFTA concerns cross-border investment and the settlement of investor disputes. 
Adams, et al. (2003) and Dee and Gali (2005) note that such agreements represent a “third wave” of RTAs that 
include substantial non-trade components.  
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outgoing U.S. FDI likely occurs due to both this endowment-based “comparative advantage 
motive” as well as the “market access motive” of horizontal FDI.  Such endowment-based 
investment may provide final or intermediate goods to both the firm’s home country and a third 
market, the latter of which might be classified by the literature as export-platform FDI (Ekholm, 
et al., 2007).  As a whole, these prior works suggest that exports and FDI are inherently linked, 
which indicates the existence of a complex relationship between FDI and trade agreements. 
FDI under a regional trade agreement may result in firm behavior and welfare outcomes 
that differ from those that occur without such an agreement.  For example, Raff (2004) 
theoretically models tax competition for FDI under regional trade agreements and shows that 
free trade agreements may either induce or deter FDI, with the outcome largely dependent on the 
production costs within the region relative to the rest of the world.  Ethier (1998a, 1998b) argues 
that RTAs may promote FDI flows to the smaller countries in a region that are driven by market 
access motives.  Similarly, Collie’s (2011) theoretical model suggests that RTAs lead to an 
increase in both FDI and trade, which occurs due to the export-platform nature of the FDI that is 
induced in such an environment. 
While these prior works provide a theoretical foundation for the link between FDI and 
RTAs, several recent empirical studies examine this relationship as well.  MacDermott (2007) 
uses a gravity model to examine the impact of NAFTA on FDI flows into NAFTA members 
from OECD countries.  He shows positive, country-specific relationships influences of NAFTA 
on FDI inflows, but also suggests that these FDI flows originate outside of the region.  Likewise, 
Medvedev’s (2012) recent study suggests that regional trade agreements encourage FDI flows 
and this effect is driven largely by the subsample of time that includes the 1990s and 2000s.  
Medvedev notes that the RTAs in this subsample are often integrated agreements that include 
investment components that may lead to significant increases in FDI flows.  While investor 
protections afforded by BITs and integrated agreements may not fully restrict FDI, such 
protection eliminates a large disincentive for firms to engage in FDI.  It is precisely this concept 
of a trade agreement that coexists with the potential for FDI that we examine later in the paper. 
Our objective is to expand the previous theoretical literature concerning FDI and trade 
agreements to address the issue of double taxation, which presents an additional obstacle to 
foreign investment.  When profits are earned by foreign subsidiaries they are taxable by the 
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foreign government and a repatriation tax imposed by the home government when the firm 
repatriates its profits.  Double taxation may be welfare-deteriorating due to the distortion of the 
cross-border post-tax return to capital.  The potential distortions from double taxation prompted 
the OECD to introduce a model tax treaty that restricts member countries to use either credits or 
exemptions in the calculation of taxes on repatriated profits.11 The theoretical and empirical 
evidence regarding the influence of double taxation treaties on FDI is mixed,12 which suggests 
that additional influences beyond changes in double-taxation policy may play a role in 
determining FDI flows.  We posit that one such influence is the establishment of regional trade 
agreements.  As noted earlier trade agreements that include investment provisions are 
increasingly common.  Likewise, the share of RTAs that are signed with prior BIT and DTT 
agreements in place is growing over time.  Columns 1 through 3 of table 1 shows bilateral 
country pairs that have signed an RTA agreement with prior DTT or BIT agreements already in 
place as a share of all bilateral country pairs entering into an RTA.13  Likewise, the signing of an 
RTA may also result in additional negotiations concerning investment and double taxation which 
may be signed before or after the RTA, but are largely part of the same negotiation effort.  
Columns 4 and 5 of table 1 shows the share of countries with both an RTA and DTT or BIT that 
signed these two types of agreements within five years of each other.  In both cases, a fairly 
substantial portion of countries with a combination of these agreements signs both agreements 
within five years of each other and this trend is growing over time.  These statistics suggest that 
policymakers view the issues concerning foreign direct investment and RTAs as interrelated, 
which is precisely the focus of our paper. 
Our model expands on the work of Haufler and Wooten (2006), Raff (2004), and Collie 
(2011) and examines the location decision and welfare implications of the interaction between 
FDI and a regional trade agreement (RTA) while also addressing the impact of double taxation.  
                                                 
11  A credit reduces the home-country taxes on repatriated profits by the amount of foreign-country taxes. 
Exemptions eliminate home-country taxes on overseas profits. A deduction, which is not permitted under the OECD 
model treaty, simply reduces the taxable income used to calculate the home-country tax.  
12 Davies (2003) uses a theoretical model to examine the OECD model treaty and finds that the use credits result in 
welfare improvements under symmetric countries, but such treaties will not necessarily result in welfare 
improvements in the case of asymmetric countries.  For mixed empirical studies, see Blonigen and Davies (2004), 
Egger et al.  (2006), Coupé, et al. (2009), Barthel, et al. (2010) and Neumayer (2007). 
13 RTAs often include more than two countries, whereas BITs and DTTs do not.  Therefore, we compare bilateral 
relationships across treaty types.  For example, a three country RTA would include three bilateral country pairs that 
could be contrasted with prior BITs and DTTs, which are bilateral in nature. 
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We contribute to the literature by examining how FDI alongside an RTA impacts behavior of 
firms, government revenue, and welfare.  We develop an asymmetric three-country model where 
firms are headquartered and owned by households in the two countries that are considering an 
RTA.  The firms produce their entire output in one country, but serve the other two countries 
through exporting.  Wage asymmetry across the two countries in the potential RTA further 
enhances the model by creating a potential for comparative advantage-based FDI and export-
platform FDI.  In the first stage of our model, the first country chooses the rate at which it will 
tax repatriated profit.  In the second stage all countries simultaneously set their tariff rates.  In the 
third stage, the firm will optimally choose to locate production in one of the three countries, 
which is a decision driven by the after-tax profit implications of the location decision as well as 
tariff rates and the cost of production in each country.  In the final stage, the firms compete via 
Cournot competition. We analyze welfare under six cases, which include (i) trade without FDI 
and without an RTA, (ii) trade with an RTA and without FDI, (iii) trade with FDI, but no RTA, 
(iv) trade when an RTA is established at the same time that ability to engage in FDI is opened, 
(v) trade when FDI occurs after an RTA is already established, and (vi) trade when FDI has 
occurred before an RTA is established.  We then extend our analysis to examine the critical 
values of a repatriation tax that induce a firm to engage in FDI when an RTA is and is not 
established. 
Table 2.1 Agreements Prior to the Signing of an RTA 
 Agreements prior to RTA signing  as a share of RTAs established 
 Share of RTAs signed within 5 
years of other agreement 
Decade 
DTT 
Only 
BIT 
Only Both BIT and DTT 
  
DTT 
 
BIT 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
1960s 0.28% 1.70% 0.00%  8.59% 23.68% 
1970s 3.83% 0.45% 0.11%  17.07% 7.14% 
1980s 1.90% 0.38% 0.08%  7.45% 16.67% 
1990s 10.99% 8.40% 11.15%  39.37% 78.68% 
2000s 7.57% 9.56% 9.79%  33.56% 49.85% 
Data Sources: UNCTAD DTT and BIT Databases, WTO RTA Database.  
Notes: RTAs often include more than two countries, whereas BITs and DTTs do not. Therefore, we compare bilateral 
relationships across treaty types. For example, a three country RTA would include three bilateral country pairs that could be 
contrasted with prior BITs and DTTs, which are bilateral in nature. RTAs are categorized by the year of entry into force, not the 
date of WTO notification. DTTs and BITs are dated accordingly to the date of signature.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the analytical 
framework of the paper and presents the firms’ optimal production decision under Cournot 
competition.  Section 3 analyzes the social welfare consequences under each case noted above.  
Section 4 then analyzes how firm’s investment decision is affected by policy, focusing on the 
government’s decision of a repatriation tax rate.  The last section concludes.   
 2 The Model 
 2.1 The Basic Assumptions 
We consider a simple three-country model in which two countries, A and B, are located 
in the same region, while a third country, C, lies outside the region.14  Countries A and B will 
potentially form a regional trade agreement, permit firms headquartered in their country to 
engage in FDI, or both. 
In both country A and country B, there is a local firm owned by the households of each 
country.  Although each firm is headquartered inside its own country, its production plant 
(denoted as country name A or B) can be located in any of the three countries. 
We assume a simple demand structure which is functionally identical across countries A 
and B, but varies with the market size of country C: 
 1A AQ p  ; 1B BQ p  ; (1 );C CQ n p        (2.1) 
where iQ  and ip  are, respectively, the consumption and price of final good in country 
( A, B, C),i   n  represents the relative size of the market in country C.  As in Haufler and 
Wooton (2006), we set [1,2]n . 
Labor is the only input in the production of the final good and technology is the same 
across countries.  Specifically, one unit of labor is used to make one unit of the final good.  
Denote jw  as the competitive wage rate in country ( , , ),j A B C  and ji  as a specific tariff (or 
subsidy) that country i  imposes on imports from country j when .i j   Both firms are able to 
                                                 
14 Country C can also represent the rest of the world. 
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segment markets such that when plant ( , )k A B  is located in country ,j  the pre-tax profit from 
servicing country i  is: 
( ) ,k kji i ji ip c x            (2.2) 
where ip  is the market price of final good in country i, kix  is the quantity sold in country i  by 
firm ,k  and .ji j jic w     Note that 0ii   when a firm is located its own country and we refer 
to “taxes” as profit and repatriation taxes, but not tariffs. 
To allow for input cost asymmetry, we assume that the wage rate is higher in country A 
than in country B.  Also, we assume that wage rate in country C is critically high.  That is, 
A Bw w  and C Aw w .  Other things being equal, this assumption eliminates the following 
possibilities: (i) plant B will locate in country A and (ii) both plants A and B will locate in 
country C. 
In this one-period game, we consider that all post-tax profits of a firm are repatriated if it 
decides to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) in another country.  As such, country A can 
choose to tax the repatriation of profits if the production plant of its firm is located country B.  
Let this repatriation tax rate be denoted as rt . 
 Following Haufler and Wooten (2006), we treat profit tax rates in countries A and B as 
predetermined.  But unlike their analysis, we assume that each of the three countries optimally 
sets tariff rate ji  on its final good import to maximize its social welfare.  To make the analysis 
simple, we assume that transportation costs are zero.  As in the trade literature, social welfare in 
each country is taken to be the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus (post-tax profit), and 
government revenue (tax plus tariff). 
 The timeline of the game is described as follows.  There is a four-stage game.  In the first 
stage, country A chooses a repatriation tax rate rt  when its firm undertakes FDI by locating its 
production plant abroad.  In the second stage, countries that import final goods produced in other 
countries set their tariff rates, ji , for goods produced in country j and exported to country i.  In 
the third stage, taking into account the afore-mentioned conditions, each firm decides where to 
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locate its plant.  In the last stage of the game, the two firms adopt a Cournot strategy and 
compete in each market. 
 2.2 Production Decisions of the Firms  
In the last stage of the game, firms A and B independently and simultaneously determine 
the quantities of their outputs in each market ( , , ).i A B C   Given the demand and profit 
equations (2.1) and (2.2) and taking into account the fact that plant B locates in its own country 
due to a relatively lower wage rate there, we calculate the equilibrium quantities, jix , when plant 
A locates in country ( , )j A B  and sells to markets ( , , )i A B C  as 
 1 (1 2 2 )
3
A
i j ji B Bix w w       and 1 (1 2 2 )3
B
i j ji B Bix w w        (2.3) 
for , ,i A B C .  For the market in country C, the quantities exported by plant A located in 
country ( , )j A B  are 
 (1 2 2 )
3
A
C j jC B BC
nx w w       and (1 2 2 ).
3
B
C j jC B BC
nx w w        (2.4) 
 3 Welfare Analysis 
We use the (i) pre-RTA regime as the benchmark to evaluate alternative regimes when 
(ii) the two regional countries A and B form an RTA, (iii) firm A undertakes FDI, or (iv) both.  
We also analyze two additional scenarios: (v) firm A undertakes FDI when an RTA is already in 
place, or the two countries consider forming an RTA when the location decisions of FDI have 
been done.  For each scenario we calculate the resulting prices, tariff rates, and social welfare.  
While trade and tax policies are set by governments, FDI decisions are made by firms.  Thus, 
given trade and tax policies a firm will choose whether or not to engage in FDI.  We specifically 
examine this relationship in section 4. 
 3.1 Benchmark Scenario Welfare  
In this and the following cases, we only report optimal tariff rates, prices of final goods in 
the three markets, and social welfare (SW) of each country.  Without lost of generality, we 
assume 0Bw   and interpret Aw  as the wage differential between the two regional countries.  For 
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the three-country trade without the formation of a regional trade agreement between countries A 
and B (i.e., the pre-RTA regime), we have 
1
3BA
  ; 1 (1 5 )
10AB A
w   ; 1 (5 13 )
35AC A
w   ; 1 (5 8 )
35BC A
w   ;  (2.5a) 
1 (4 3 )
9A A
p w  ; 2
5B
p  ; 1 (3 2 )
7C A
p w  ;     (2.5b) 
2 24 38 48 11 144 23
49 45 245 18 1225 50
A
A A A A ASW n w nw w nw      ;    (2.5c) 
2 24 7 8 7 4 1337
49 54 245 18 1225 4050
B
A A A A ASW n w nw w nw      ;    (2.5d) 
where kjSW  denotes country k ’s social welfare when plant A is located in country .j    
 We consider the situations that tariff rates set by the three countries are all positive and 
that the final good prices exceed their marginal/average costs under imperfect competition.  
Based on the analytical framework, we note that as long as AB  is positive under the pre-RTA 
regime, the equilibrium values of the model are all positive.  It follows from equation (2.5a) that 
the regional wage differential should satisfy the following condition: 1 5Aw  .  Throughout the 
analysis, we assume that this wage differential condition holds. 
 3.2 Welfare Effect of an RTA without FDI 
For the case in which countries A and B sign an RTA to promote free trade but this RTA 
does not affect the decisions of the international producers on FDI, we have the following 
solutions: 
1 (5 13 )
35AC A
w   ; 1 (5 8 )
35BC A
w   ;      (2.6a) 
1 (1 )
3A B A
p p w   ; 1 (3 2 )
7C A
p w  ;      (2.6b) 
2 24 10 48 17 144 4
49 9 245 18 1225 9
A
A A A A ASW n w nw w nw      ;    (2.6c) 
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2 24 2 8 5 4 4
49 9 245 18 1225 9
B
A A A A ASW n w nw w nw      .     (2.6d) 
 Under the assumption that the regional wage differential falls within the range of 
1 5Aw  , it is easy to verify from (2.5a) and (2.6a) that external tariff rates are lower after the 
formation of an RTA.  It is also easy to see the final good prices in the regional countries are 
lower under the RTA, implying that consumers there are better off.   
Next, we compare social welfare between the pre-RTA regime and the RTA regime 
without affecting FDI.  It follows from equations (2.5c), (2.5d), (2.6c), and (2.6d) that 
A A
A ASW SW ;           (2.6e) 
B B
A ASW SW ; A B A BA A A ASW SW SW SW   .      (2.6f) 
The findings in equations (2.6e) and (2.6f) permits us to establish 
PROPOSITION 2.1. When two regional countries with wage cost asymmetry form an RTA 
without affecting any relocation of their production plants, the RTA is welfare-improving for the 
low-wage country and the region, but is welfare-deteriorating for the high-wage country. 
The formation of an RTA makes consumers in the regional countries better off.  The 
opening of free trade in the region leads to increased competition in the final good markets, 
causing their prices to decrease.  But there is a greater fall in final good price in the high-wage 
country.  An immediate result of the lower price is smaller output by both firms.  Firm profits 
decrease in the high-wage country, but increase in the low-wage country.  As a result, forming an 
RTA makes the high-wage country worse off but the low-wage country better-off.  
 3.3 Welfare Effect of FDI without an RTA 
In this section we examine welfare implications when firm A locates its plant in country B (that 
is, firm A decides to undertake its FDI in country B).  In this case, there is no RTA between the 
two counties.  We calculate tariff rates, final good prices, and social welfare for this case as 
follows: 15 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that the repatriation tax is welfare neutral for country A assuming that firm A locates its 
plant in country B; the tax simply transfers and reallocates firm A’s post-tax profit to country’s A government 
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 It is instructive to use graphs to illustrate the relationships between these two sets of 
social welfares.  Graphical analysis shows that the change of n has no qualitative effect on the 
welfare comparison.  In Figure 2.2, we set 1.6n   and plot Aw  against Bt .  In Areas 1 to 3, 
where the wage differential is relatively small, there is welfare deterioration for the regional 
countries when the production plant is relocated to country B.  In Area 4, it is welfare-improving 
for the region and country A when there is an FDI in country B.  Under this circumstance, 
country A has an incentive to enact policies that induce FDI.  In Area 5, while it is welfare-
improving for the region and country B when there is an FDI there, it is welfare-deteriorating for 
country A.  In Area 6, if firm A locates its plant in country B, then welfare will be improved in 
each signatory country and, hence, the region. 
PROPOSITION 2.2.  Given the rate of profit tax on FDI set by a host country, FDI through a 
relocation of production plant from a high-wage country to a low-wage country is welfare-
deteriorating for the two-country region when their wage cost asymmetry is critically small.  
However, if the wage cost asymmetry is significantly large, the FDI is welfare-improving for at 
least one of the two countries (Area 4 for the high-wage country and Area 5 for the low-wage 
country) or both (Area 6), depending on the degree of wage cost asymmetry and the profit tax 
rate in the low-wage country. 
Figure 2.1 Comparing Welfare of FDI without an RTA 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
revenue.  However, the repatriation tax rate does have implications for the firm’s location decision.  We specifically 
examine this relationship in section 4. 
BB
Aw  
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When there is FDI, all production of the final good for domestic consumption and 
exporting takes places in the low-wage country.  In this case, there is no tariff revenue for the 
country.  However, the low-wage country is able collect revenues from taxing the profits of firm 
A, which sells final goods to all three markets.  Consumers in the low-wage country are better 
off because of a lower price for their consumption of final goods produced by the two firms.  
Consumers in the high-wage country are worse off due to the following two reasons: one is 
tariffs imposed by its own country on the final good imports, the other is profit taxes imposed by 
the government of the low-wage country.  Profits of the firms are affected negatively due to 
increased competition, except when the tax rate in the low-wage country is low. 
 3.4 Welfare Effect of FDI with an RTA 
The next case of interest is when FDI occurs at the same time as the formation of an 
RTA.  We calculate the equilibrium tariff, final good prices, and social welfare in an RTA when 
firm A chooses to locate its production plant in country B.   
1
4BC
  ; 1
3A B
p p  ; 1
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p  ;       (2.8a) 
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 It is easy to verify from equations (2.5c), (2.5d), and (2.8b) that 
B B
B ASW SW ; A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW   .      (2.8c) 
AA 
RR 
Bt  
0.102 
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0.061 
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 In terms of social welfare for country A, we find that the effect cannot be determined 
unambiguously.  Setting 1.6,n   we use Figure 2.3 to illustrate a cut-off line above which 
A A
B ASW SW . 
Figure 2.2 Comparing Welfare of the High-wage Country of FDI with an RTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This analysis leads to  
PROPOSITION 2.3. Forming an RTA between two regional countries with wage cost 
asymmetry alongside the relocation of production plant from the high-wage country to the low-
wage country, is welfare-improving for the latter as well as for the region, but is welfare-
deteriorating for the high-wage country if the wage differential is small or profit tax of the low-
wage country is high. 
As in the case of the RTA without the relocation of Plant A, the existence of the RTA 
increases consumer surplus of both regional countries.  For the low-wage country, the increase of 
consumer surplus together with the extra tax revenue from FDI and extra profit of firm 2 from 
sales in country A, are enough to compensate the losses of firm profits in other markets and tariff 
revenue due to RTA, with the result that there is a net increase in social welfare.  For the high-
wage country, however, the increase in consumer surplus cannot compensate other losses and 
result in a decrease in total SW. 
0.041 
Aw  
At  
A A
B ASW SW  
A A
B ASW SW  
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 3.5 FDI under the presence of a previously established RTA 
If the ability to locate overseas is made possible after the establishment of an RTA, firm 
A has a stronger incentive to move overseas since the only thing at stake is wage differential.  
We model this as two separate decisions and not a sequential game.  To access the welfare 
implication, we analyze social welfare by comparing the following pairs of social welfares: 
A
ASW  and 
A
BSW ;         (2.9a) 
B
ASW  and 
B
BSW ;         (2.9b) 
A B
A ASW SW  and A BB BSW SW .       (2.9c) 
It can be verified that the following inequality holds: 
B B
B ASW SW .          (2.9d) 
For comparing social welfare for country A as well as the two-country region, we present 
the graphical results in Figure 2.4.  For the four regimes, we have 
Area 1: 
A A
B ASW SW , A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW   ;     (2.10a)  
 Area 2: 
A A
B ASW SW , A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW   ;     (2.10b) 
 Area 3: 
A A
B ASW SW , A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW   ;     (2.10c) 
 Area4: 
A A
B ASW SW , A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW   .     (2.10d) 
When 1.6n  , the critical value for A B A BB B A ASW SW SW SW    to hold is 0.057Aw  .  
These results lead to 
PROPOSITION 2.4. In the presence of a previously established RTA between a high-wage 
country and a low-wage country, FDI is welfare-deteriorating for the latter.  When the wage 
differential is critically small, this additional FDI is welfare-deteriorating for the high-wage 
country and the region too (areas 2 and 4).  When the wage differential is sufficiently but not 
critically large, this additional FDI is welfare-improving for the high-wage country but not for 
the region (area 3).  Only when wage differential is critically high this additional FDI is welfare-
improving for the high-wage country and the region (area 1). 
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Figure 2.3 Comparing Welfare of the High-wage Country and Region of the Additional 
FDI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 As in any other case with new FDI (sections 3.3 and 3.4), the presence of FDI increases 
competition in all markets, causing the profit of firm B to decline.  A decrease in consumer 
surplus has a negative effect on country B’s welfare, but this negative effect is offset by a 
collection of profit tax from plant A.  On the other hand, the regional wage differential must be 
sufficiently high to make the relocation of plant A to be profitable. 
 3.6 Welfare effect of an RTA when FDI has already occurred 
Similar to the analysis in Section 3.5, we assume that RTA and FDI are two separate 
decisions and that firm A has already located its plant in country B before the establishment of 
the RTA.  In this case, we conduct a welfare comparison for the following pairs: 
A
BSW  and 
A
BSW ;         (2.11a) 
B
BSW  and 
B
BSW ;         (2.11b) 
A B
B BSW SW  and A BB BSW SW .       (2.11c) 
It can be verified that, under the assumption of 1 5Aw  , the following relationships hold: 
B B
B BSW SW ;           (2.11d) 
At  
Aw  
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1 
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A B A B
B B B BSW SW SW SW   .        (2.11e) 
 For the welfare of country A, there exists a critical value of 0.576Bt   below which 
A A
B BSW SW .  We present the economic implications of these findings in the following 
proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2.5. When FDI through a relocation of the production plant from a high-wage 
country to a low-wage country is in existence despite import tariffs set by their respective 
governments, forming an RTA is a welfare-improving option for the low-wage country and the 
region.  If profit tax set by the low-wage country is not critically high, the RTA formation is also 
welfare-improving for the high-wage country.   
This case is similar to the one that involves the trade regime change from pre-RTA to 
RTA.  Eliminations of import tariffs by the two regional governments allow firm B in the low-
wage country to make higher profits.  The difference between this case and the case discussed in 
Section 3.1 (Welfare Effect of an RTA without FDI) is that firm A’s profits earned in country B 
are subject to the profit tax policy there. 
 4 Determining the Critical Value of Repatriation Tax Rate 
 
In this section, we analyze economic effects of repatriation taxes.  Repatriation taxes 
constitute an important issue in the taxation of multinational firms in the literature.  In our 
analysis, we look at how a repatriation tax set by the high-wage country affects the profits of its 
firm in undertaking FDI in the low-wage country.  Accordingly, the use of a repatriation tax, rt , 
is to influence the location decision of a firm’s production plant. 
We solve for the critical value of a repatriation tax for two cases.  The critical repatriation 
tax rate makes firm A indifferent between locating its production plant at home or in country B.  
The first case is when an RTA does not exist (and FDI is assumed to be allowed).  The second 
case is when both countries A and B engage in trade under an RTA (and FDI is assumed to be 
allowed).   
Case I:   
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This critical value of rt  for the case without an RTA (but with FDI) satisfies the following 
condition:  
, , , ,
(1 ) (1 )(1 )A r AA Ai B Bii A B C i A B Ct t t       ,     (2.12) 
where the term on the LHS is firm A’s post-tax profit when its plant is located within its own 
country, and the term on the RHS is firm A’s post-tax profit when its plant is located in country 
B.  Solving for the critical value of rt  when there is no regional trade agreement between 
countries A and B yields  
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From equation (2.13), we have the following comparative statics derivatives:  
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 Note that the sufficient condition in equation (2.14b) is increasing with n  and the 
minimum value of the fraction is equal to 0.2028.   This implies that ˆ 0r At w    always holds 
for 0.2028.Aw   We thus have the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2.6. When there is no RTA, the critical value of repatriation tax rate, above 
which the high-wage regional country is able to induce its firm to produce domestically, is 
positively related to its profit tax rate and the relative size of the market outside the region, but is 
negatively related to the profit tax rate set by the low-wage regional country.  There is no 
unambiguous relationship between the critical repatriation tax rate and the wage cost 
asymmetry.  Only when the wage cost asymmetry is sufficiently small will the critical 
repatriation tax rate be positively related to the wage cost asymmetry. 
Case II:  
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Next, we define rt  as the critical value of the repatriation tax rate for the case with both FTA 
and FDI between the two regional countries.  Making use of equation (2.12) and considering the 
presence of an RTA, we solve for rt  as follows: 
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From equation (2.15), we have the following comparative statics derivatives: 
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 This naturally leads to  
PROPOSITION 2.7. In the presence of an RTA between two regional countries, the critical 
value of the repatriation tax rate is positively related to the profit tax rate set by the high-wage 
country and the degree of wage cost asymmetry, but is negatively related to the profit tax rate set 
by the low-wage country and the relative size of the market outside the region. 
 For both ˆrt  and rt , the effect of wage differential and profit tax rates is intuitive.  When 
the profit tax rate of the home country is relatively high (higher At  or lower Bt ), the firm has a 
higher incentive to locate its plant in country B.   This implies that a higher profit tax rate rt  is 
required to keep the firm within its home country.  The same logic applies when the wage 
differential is large.  The economic effect associated with the market size of the outside country 
is somewhat surprising, however.  The reason is that when there is no RTA between the two 
regional countries, the tariff rate is higher for the final good from country B to A as compared to 
that from country B to C (see BA  and BC  in Section 3.2).  Thus, firm A has a higher incentive 
to locate its production plant in country B and export more of the final good to country C.  On 
the other hand, when there is an RTA between the two regional countries, which means zero 
tariff on final good from country B to A, the size of country C.  This is because the increase in 
sales due to the larger demand is more than offset by tariff costs. 
  It is instructive to compare the critical repatriation tax rates as derived above for the two 
different cases.  It follows from equations (2.13) and (2.15) that  
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 ˆr rt t . 
PROPOSITION 2.8. The critical value of the repatriation tax rate that induces the firm of the 
high-wage country to locate its plant in the high-wage country is higher when there is no RTA 
than when there is an RTA.    
The relationship between these critical repatriation tax rates and welfare can be 
interpreted as follows.  Without an RTA, it is in the interest of the high-wage country to set a 
high repatriation tax rate to encourage its firm to produce domestically.  The high-wage country 
will choose such a repatriation tax rate if locating the production plant abroad is welfare-
deteriorating as indicated by the results in Proposition 2.2.  For the case with an RTA, however, 
only a mild repatriation tax rate is required to keep the plant within the country because zero 
tariffs lower the costs of exports to member countries. The relationship between the two 
repatriation tax rates implies that the signing of an RTA would not induce FDI unless the high-
wage country also lowers its repatriation tax rate.  As shown in Proposition 2.3, the high-wage 
country would benefit from the signing of the RTA and a decrease in the repatriation tax rate if 
the wage differential is sufficiently large or if the profit tax of the low-wage country is 
sufficiently small.  For the case in which the repatriation tax rate is low and the firm finds it 
profitable to locate its plant in the low-wage country with the presence of an RTA, the 
elimination of the RTA would not affect the firm’s location decision.  
 5 Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we derive economic conditions under which regional countries have 
incentives to create FDI-enabling policies, with or without forming a regional trade agreement.  
Using a stylized three-country model, we express these conditions in terms of profit tax rates, 
wage cost asymmetry, and the market size outside of the region.   
We show that the formation of an RTA between two regional countries with wage cost 
asymmetry makes the low-wage country and the region better off, but can be welfare-
deteriorating for the high-wage country.  Other things being equal, FDI through a relocation of 
production plant from the high-wage country to the low-wage country can be welfare-improving 
or welfare-deteriorating, depending on the degree of wage cost asymmetry between the 
countries.  When wage cost asymmetry is significantly large, FDI is welfare-improving for at 
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least one of the two countries or both.  When FDI through the relocation of the production plant 
from a high-wage country to a low-wage country exists despite import tariffs set by their 
respective governments, RTA formation is a welfare-improving option for the high-wage country 
and the region.  If the profit tax set by the low-wage country is not critically high, forming the 
RTA is also a welfare-improving option for the low-wage country.   
The analysis in this paper is able to reconcile several observations and prior findings with 
theory.  Our results support the findings of Adams, et al. (2003), who note the increasing 
tendency of RTAs with investment provisions and their corresponding positive influence on FDI 
flows.  If a high-wage country is to enter into an RTA with a low-wage country, then policies 
that positively influence FDI, such as investment provisions within the RTA or BITs that were 
signed prior to the RTA, will likely improve the welfare outcome of the high-wage country.  The 
inclusion of such investment provisions, or the signing of additional agreements as shown in our 
descriptive statistics, would likely result in the positive FDI flows identified by Medvedev 
(2012).  We further discuss issues on repatriation taxes under different trade regimes.  Our 
results suggest that the signing of an RTA is not, by itself, influential in inducing FDI from the 
high-wage country to the low wage country in an environment with double taxation.   However, 
the critical threshold of the repatriation tax that makes a firm indifferent in terms of its location 
decision varies across trade regimes, which suggests the impact of double taxation treaties on 
FDI flows may be largely influenced by the trade regime.   We expect that further attention to 
trade agreements in future empirical work will help to reconcile the different findings currently 
found in the literature concerning double taxation treaties and their impact on FDI. 
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Chapter 3 - War’s Inefficiency Puzzle: An Economic Theory of 
Bargaining and Fighting with Endogenous Destruction 
 1 Introduction 
Wars and fighting recur throughout human history and their causes are complex. 16  
Among the challenging and puzzling questions posed to social scientists are as follows.  Why do 
nations, political factions, interest groups or individuals (e.g., workers and capitalists, family 
members, etc.) choose to fight despite the fact that fighting is costly and in many cases highly 
destructive?  What determines the conditions under which conflictual parties have incentives for 
engaging in negotiations to resolve their disputes and to avoid costly fighting?  Conventional 
thinking holds that costly fighting is inferior to settlement through bargaining.  The works of 
Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999, 2002, 2004) are among the influential contributions that 
popularize the “war’s inefficiency puzzle.”  In particular, Fearon (1995) states that 
[N]one of the principal rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an 
explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is 
costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all 
would prefer to the gamble of war. (p. 380) 
 
Powell (2004) further indicates that 
 
Civil wars, revolutions, litigation, strikes, economic sanctions, international conflict, and the use 
of power in general pose an inefficiency puzzle (italics added).  Suppose that a group of actors is 
bargaining about how to resolve an issue or, more abstractly, about how to divide a “pie.”  One 
or more of them can affect the outcome and possibly even impose a division through the use of 
some form of power—be it military, economic, legal, or more broadly political. The exercise of 
power, however, consumes resources, and, consequently, the pie to be divided among the 
bargainers before anyone tries to impose a settlement is larger than it will be afterward. As a 
result, there usually are divisions of the larger pie that would have given each bargainer more 
than it will obtain from an imposed settlement.  The use of power, in other words, leads to Pareto 
                                                 
16 The influential works in the economic literature include the earlier studies by Haavelmo (1954), Schelling (1957, 
1960), and Boulding (1962).  See also the contributions by Brito and Intriligator (1985), Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 
1991, 1995, 2000), Fearon (1995), Grossman (1991, 1995), Grossman and Kim (1995, 1996), Alesina and Spolaore 
(1997), Powell (1999, 2004, 2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000), 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Grossman and Mendoza (2001), Skaperdas (2006), Leventoğlu and Slantchev 
(2007), Baliga and Sjöström (2008), Besley and Persson (2008, 2009, 2010), and Chassang and Padro i Miquel 
(2010), to name a few.  Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) present a systematic review of interesting studies on the 
economics of conflict. 
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inefficient outcomes.  Why, then, do the bargainers sometimes fail to reach a Pareto superior 
agreement prior to the explicit use of power? (p. 231) 
 
In the present paper, we tackle this fundamental question about wars and fighting within 
the rational-choice framework of economic decision-making without incomplete information or 
misconceptions.  Specifically, we develop a general equilibrium model of production and 
appropriation, attempting to present an economic analysis to resolving the long-standing puzzle 
of war’s inefficiency in the theoretical conflict literature.  We consider the scenario that two 
conflictual parties engage in unbiased negotiations to avoid war when fighting or armed 
confrontation is costly and destructive.  In the positive analysis with complete information, we 
assume that fighting’s destructiveness is endogenously increasing in armaments or combative 
inputs.  Quite contrary to the conventional wisdom that bargaining is Pareto superior over 
fighting, we show conditions under which fighting constitutes a Nash equilibrium choice and is a 
Pareto improvement relative to bargaining.  We find that, under the shadow of conflict, locating 
a settlement through bargaining is costly.  Fighting may actually be a preferred choice, despite 
that it is second-best as compared to the Pareto ideal outcome of “total peace” without 
armaments.    
In modeling the optimal choice between bargaining and fighting, we pay particular 
attention to differences between direct costs (e.g., arms buildups) and indirect costs (e.g., 
destruction to productive resources) of conflict.  In military conflict, for instance, fighting 
involves both arms costs and the resulting destruction costs in terms of consumable resources 
destroyed.  Our model shows that, under the shadow of conflict, contending parties 
unambiguously allocate more resources to armaments for guarding a settlement through 
bargaining than for fighting.  The equilibrium amount of the non-military, consumable good 
produced is then relatively lower in settlement bargaining than in the event of fighting.  
Bargaining is thus more costly than fighting in terms of the consumable good forgone.  This 
implies that there are “gains from fighting” in terms of the consumable good produced.  These 
gains provide strong incentives for the adversaries to fight.  When the resulting destruction costs 
of fighting are lower than its gains, fighting dominates bargaining as the dominant strategy.  In 
equilibrium, war costs (i.e., arms costs plus destruction costs) are shown to be less than 
settlement costs (i.e., the costs of resources allocated to guarding the bargaining settlement), 
causing each party’s expected payoff to be relatively higher under war.  The condition that 
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facilitates fighting depends not only on arming, but also on the endogeneity of fighting’s 
destructiveness.  Given that bargaining is costly under the shadow of conflict, the argument that 
war is costly does not imply that bargaining is always preferable to fighting.  Our theoretical 
findings may help explain the general causes of wars, strikes, international conflict without 
incomplete information or misperceptions. 
But when the endogenous destruction costs are higher than gains from fighting, each 
party’s expected payoff becomes relatively higher in the bargaining settlement.  In equilibrium, 
war costs exceed settlement costs.  That is, arms costs plus destruction costs are greater than the 
costs of resources allocated to arming for protecting the settlement.  Consequently, bargaining is 
a Pareto-improving choice and the relatively higher level of arming under settlement (than that 
under war) is efficient in generating an effective deterrence.  This result has an important 
implication for the economics of “armed peace.”  Within the framework of conflict with 
endogenously increasing destruction, allocating more resources to arming is not inconsistent with 
bargaining for a mutually acceptable settlement.  This suggests that, for launching a peace talk 
between adversaries, arms reductions are perceived as Pareto-suboptimal to the parties and hence 
will generally not be accepted on a voluntary basis.  These results stand in stark contrast to the 
conventional wisdom on arms reductions for the purpose of promoting peace.17 
In the general equilibrium analysis, we explicitly characterize the simultaneous 
interaction of conflict technology, production technology, and “destruction technology” (in terms 
of fighting’s destructiveness) in determining the optimal allocations of resources to productive 
and combative activities by the contending parties, as well as their choices between fighting and 
bargaining.  We do not impose any specific functional forms on conflict and production 
technologies in the analysis.  We consider different modes of military technology to capture the 
endogeneity of increasing destruction, an important element of armed confrontation not 
adequately analyzed in the theoretical conflict literature.  Our simple model indicates that the 
availability of unbiased negotiations for resolving disputes between adversaries does not 
guarantee that fighting will not break out.  Preparing relatively fewer armaments under 
settlement in the shadow of conflict may only jeopardize the parties’ capabilities in guarding a 
                                                 
17 See Baliga and Sjöström (2004) for an analysis of arms race and peace deals.  They show, among other things, the 
conditions under which arms race always occurs and a cheap talk can resolve such dilemma. 
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bargaining settlement once fighting breaks out.  This is especially true when property rights are 
imperfectly specified or when there exists no enforceable mechanism for achieving the “ideal” or 
first-best outcome of total peace (with low or no resources allocated to arming).   
This paper makes no intention to address issues concerning the actual causes of specific 
wars in history.  The primary objective of the game-theoretic analysis is to resolve the 
inefficiency puzzle of war, the central issue that underlines academic debates about the general 
causes of fighting.  From the positive economic perspective, we show that conflictual parties 
may perceive it beneficial to initiate a war, without the presumptions of incomplete information, 
misperceptions, commitment problems, indivisibilities, or negotiation failures as suggested by 
Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999, 2004, 2006).  These underlying conditions are undeniably the 
possible causes of wars and may explain many facets of historical conflicts.  Nevertheless, these 
conditions do not adequately resolve the central puzzle concerning why bargaining settlements 
are not preferred to costly wars (see the quotations).  In contrast to the argument that war is more 
costly than settlement, we find that bargaining under the threat of conflict can be more costly 
than fighting (in terms of resources allocated to armaments or combative inputs).  Not 
surprisingly, bettering the bargaining position or guarding a mutually acceptable settlement is 
highly costly.  The likelihood of achieving a negotiated settlement or not thus depends crucially 
on the endogeneity of fighting’s destructiveness.  Our analysis presents an answer to the puzzling 
question raised by Powell (2004) concerning “why the bargainers sometimes fail to reach a 
Pareto superior agreement prior to the explicit use of power.”  We further analyze the robustness 
of our primary findings by investigating alternative types of destruction technology. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out the general  
equilibrium model of bargaining and fighting between conflictual parties under complete 
information.  In this section, we first discuss assumptions on conflict technology, production 
technology, and destruction technology.  We then derive and compare the fighting equilibrium 
and the bargaining equilibrium in terms of combative inputs and expected payoffs under 
symmetry.  Section 3 extends the analysis to allow for conflict with alternative settings of 
destruction.  Section 4 concludes. 
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 2 The Baseline Model 
 2.1 Basic Assumptions and the Endogeneity of Destruction 
To show the tradeoff between production and appropriation and to analyze the general 
causes of war, we consider a simple general equilibrium model of fighting and bargaining 
between two conflictual parties, denoted as 1 and 2.  The two parties are rational and risk-neutral 
in seeking control over resources or gaining political dominance.  Each party is endowed with a 
fixed amount of an inalienable resource ,R  which can be transformed into a non-combative 
(productive) input, ,x  and a combative (appropriative) input, .y 18   The resource constraint 
facing each party is i iR x y  . 
Departing from the conflict models of Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas 
(2006) that adopt the solution concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium, we assume that the 
conflictual parties play a simultaneous Nash non-cooperative game.  Specifically, under 
complete information, the two parties choose between fighting and bargaining and, at the same 
time, determine their optimal allocations of resources to non-combative and combative inputs, 
{ , }.i ix y   This assumption rules out the commitment problem or failure as discussed in Fearon 
(1995).  For example, when party 1 chooses to fight, it concurrently determine its optimal values 
of 1 1{ , }x y  for fighting a war under the belief that party 2 will do the same under complete 
information and symmetry.  The same logic applies to the case of settlement bargaining (but 
under the shadow of conflict) and when party 2 makes its decision.  We further assume that war 
breaks out when either party chooses to fight. 
Following Hirshleifer (1992) and Skaperdas (1992), we hypothesize that party 1 and 
party 2 jointly produce a consumable good using their productive inputs 1x  and 2.x  The 
assumption of joint production parallels the notion of the integrative system as developed by 
Boulding (1962, 1963).  In explaining a socio-economic system in which production and 
appropriation co-exist, Boulding (1963) remarks that the system is fundamentally governed by 
three subsystems: the threat system, the exchange system, and the integrative system.  Boulding 
(1963) further stresses the importance of the integrative system in that it “establishes community 
                                                 
18 The combative inputs can broadly be defined as guns, weapons, armaments, and soldiers in military conflict, 
efforts in rent-seeking activities, or monetary expenditures in litigation. 
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between the threatener and the threatened and produces common values and common interest” 
(p. 430).  For example, countries in the global community engage in exchange of commodities 
based on the comparative advantage principle, but they may also engage in inter-state conflicts.  
The notion of the integrative system also applies to nation as a community where factions or 
interest groups devote their resources to producing goods and services for exchange (i.e., 
production), but they may also engage in intra-state conflicts or civil wars (i.e., appropriation).  
We thus assume that the technology of producing a consumable good is summarized by 
ASSUMPTION 3.1 (Production Technology). The technology of producing a consumable 
good takes the general form: 1 2( , ),Q f x x  which is concave in productive inputs.  That is,    
0,
ix
i
ff
x
   
2
2 0,i ix x
i
ff
x
   and 
2( ) 0
i i j j i jx x x x x x
f f f   for , 1, 2,i j   and .i j  (3.1) 
Given that ,i i ix R y   the production function is 1 1 2 2( , ).Q f R y R y    
When property rights are imperfectly defined or enforced, the consumable good produced 
constitutes the overall contestable or negotiable resource for the two parties.  This consumable 
good can be disposed either (i) through fighting with uncertain outcome or (ii) through 
bargaining with a mutually agreeable outcome but under the shadow of conflict.  If the two 
parties decide to resolve their disputes over the distribution of the consumable good by fighting, 
the equilibrium shares of the good are determined by a conflict technology.  If the two parties 
choose to settle disputes through bargaining, their equilibrium outcome is determined by a 
mutually acceptable sharing rule or norm that will be discussed later. 
Let the technology of conflict be such that party 1’s winning probability is 1 2( , )p y y  and 
party 2’s winning probability is 1 21 ( , ).p y y   Note that these probabilities depend on the parties’ 
allocations of resources to their combative inputs.  Following Dixit (1987) and Skaperdas (1992), 
the conflict technology or the contest success function (expressed in terms of 1 2( , )p y y ) satisfies 
some standard  properties as summarized in19 
                                                 
19 Skaperdas (1996) is the first to present an axiomatic approach to different classes of CSFs.  In analyzing inter- or 
intra-group conflicts, an additive form of CSF is widely used (see. e.g., Hirshleifer (1997), Gershenson and 
Grossman (2000), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000, 2007), and Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007a) ).  Konrad (2007) 
presents a systematic review of studies on contest and conflict that employ different forms of CSFs. 
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ASSUMPTION 3.2 (Conflict Technology). Defining the first- and second-order derivatives of 
the contest success function 1 2( , )p y y  as 
  1 2( , )
iy
i
p y yp
y
  , 
2
1 2
2
( , )
i iy y
i
p y yp
y
  , and 
2
1 2( , )
i j j iy y y y
i j
p y yp p
y y
     for , 1, 2,i j    and ,i j  
we assume that they satisfy the following conditions: 
1
0 ,yp    2 0,yp    1 1 0,y yp   2 2 0,y yp        (3.2) 
 and 
1 2 2 1
1 2
1 2
0  y ,
0  y .y y y y
as y
p p
as y
   
 
Next, we introduce into the conflict analysis the endogeneity of fighting’s destructiveness 
associated with combative inputs.  Besides the direct costs of conflict as measured by resources 
allocated to the combative inputs (e.g., arms buildups), there are indirect costs of conflict in 
terms of consumable resources destroyed.  For the purpose of our theoretical model, we adopt 
the plausible assumption that total destruction, ,D  is endogenously determined by the combative 
input allocations of the conflicting parties, i.e., 1 2( , ).D D y y   This total destruction function 
satisfies certain properties as described in 
ASSUMPTION 3.3 (Destruction Technology). Destruction technology is depicted by an 
endogenous and increasing damage to the consumable good in the event of fighting.  Further, 
total destruction is a convex function of the combative inputs 1y  and 2y  such that for , 1, 2,i j   
,i j  
1 2( , ) 0,
iy
i
D y yD
y
   
2
1 2
2
( , ) 0,
i iy y
i
D y yD
y
   
2
1 2( , ) 0,
i j j iy y y y
i j
D y yD D
y y
      (3.3) 
  and 2( ) 0.
i i j j i jy y y y y y
D D D   
Assumption 3.3 indicates that, when two parties choose to fight, the resulting 
destructiveness is a monotonically increasing and convex function of their combative input 
allocations.  An increase in iy  increases the amount of the consumable good destroyed when war 
breaks out.  Marginal destruction, defined as 1 2( , ) ,iy iD D y y y    is strictly positive.  Also, 
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marginal destruction of a party’s combative input iy  is non-decreasing in its rival’s combative 
input .jy  That is, 1 2( , ) 0.iy jD y y y    
We proceed to analyze the equilibrium outcomes of fighting and bargaining, and the 
optimal allocations of resources to the productive and combative activities under the alternative 
decisions.  We then compare their equilibrium expected payoffs.  Last, when there is an 
exogenous change in the destructiveness multiplier, we examine the change in equilibrium 
allocations and outcomes.  Unless otherwise noted, detailed proofs and the deviations of model 
results are to be found in the Appendix B. 
 2.2 Nash Equilibrium in the Event of Fighting 
We begin our analysis with the scenario where the two parties choose to resolve their 
disputes by means of fighting.  Denote WiV  as the expected payoff that party i  receives from 
fighting.  The two parties’ expected payoffs are: 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,WV p y y f R y R y D y y         (3.4a) 
  2 1 2 1 2 1 21 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .WV p y y f R y R y D y y          (3.4b) 
This specification recognizes that each party’s payoff is determined by the conflict technology, 
1 2( , ),p y y  the pre-fighting production of the consumable good, 1 2( , ),Q f R y R y    as well as 
the destruction technology, 1 2( , ).D y y   The parameter ( 0)   converts total destruction into each 
party’s payoff and is treated as a “destructiveness multiplier.”  An increase in   (ceteris 
paribus) can be treated as an exogenous advancement in the destruction technology of weapons. 
 The first-order conditions (FOCs) for the two conflicting parties are: 
1 1 1
1
1
( ) ( ) 0,
W
y x y
V p Q D p f D
y
                   (3.5a) 
2 2 2
2
2
( ) (1 )( ) 0.
W
y x y
V p Q D p f D
y
                (3.5b) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
W Wy y  as the optimal combative input allocations in the fighting equilibrium that 
satisfy the FOCs in (3.5).  We show in Appendix B.2 that the second-order conditions (SOCs) 
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for the expected payoff maximization problems are satisfied.  These conditions ensure the strict 
concavity of WiV  in .
W
iy   We also show that the Jacobian determinant of the FOCs for the two 
parties at the event of fighting is strictly positive.  This indicates that there is an interior solution 
for the fighting equilibrium, 1 2{ , }.
W Wy y  
 2.3 Nash Equilibrium under Settlement (but in the Shadow of Conflict) 
We proceed to discuss the second scenario where the adversaries choose to negotiate and 
resolve their disputes through a bargaining settlement (but under the threat of conflict due to 
imperfect enforcement in property rights).  In modeling bargaining, there are different rules that 
may be employed by the parties.  We assume that the two parties agree to use the Nash 
bargaining rule.  It should be noted that, in our analytical framework, the Nash bargaining is 
equivalent to the split-the-surplus rule.20 
Denote   as the share that party 1 receives when both parties settle their disputes by 
negotiations.  It follows that the share for party 2 is (1 ).   Letting SiV  represent party i’s 
payoff under settlement, we have  
1
SV Q  and 2 (1 ) ,SV Q          (3.6) 
where 1 2( , ).Q f R y R y     Under the Nash bargaining rule, the two parties negotiate mutually 
acceptable shares, denoted as { ,1 },   such that  
1 1 2 2arg max( )( ).
S W S WV V V V     
The expected payoffs WiV  and 
S
iV  are respectively given by equations (3.4) and (3.6).  We show 
in Appendix B.1 that the optimal shares mutually agreeable to both parties are:    
(2 1)
2
p Dp
Q
    and (2 1)1 1
2
p Dp
Q
     .     (3.7) 
Substituting { ,1 }   from equations (3.7) into the expected payoff functions in (3.6) yields the 
following: 
                                                 
20 We show in the Appendix the equivalence in the mutually acceptable shares between Nash bargaining and the 
split-the-surplus rule, a sharing rule under settlement as discussed in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000). 
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  1 21 1 2 1 2 1 2 ( , )( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,2S
D y yV p y y f R y R y D y y          (3.8a) 
   1 22 1 2 1 2 1 2 ( , )1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .2S
D y yV p y y f R y R y D y y           (3.8b) 
Despite the bargaining settlement, imperfect enforcement of the “contract” requires the two 
parties to allocate resources to combative inputs for protecting their negotiated shares of the 
consumable good.  Under the shadow of conflict, the FOCs for the two parties in bargaining are: 
1 1 1
1 1
1
( ) ( ) 0,
2
S
y x y
V Dp Q D p f D
y
                  (3.9a) 
2 2 2
2 2
2
( ) (1 )( ) 0.
2
S
y x y
V Dp Q D p f D
y
                (3.9b) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
S Sy y  as the optimal combative input allocations in the bargaining equilibrium that 
satisfy the FOCs in (3.9).  We show in Appendix B.2 that the SOCs for the expected payoff 
maximization problems are satisfied.  These conditions ensure the strict concavity of SiV  in 
S
iy .  
We also show that the Jacobian determinant of the FOCs for the two parties in settlement 
bargaining is strictly positive.  This indicates that there is an interior solution for the bargaining 
equilibrium, 1 2{ , }.
S Sy y  
 2.4 Comparison between Fighting and Bargaining 
We are now in a position to analyze and compare whether the two conflictual parties will 
allocate more or less amounts of their resources to combative inputs between the two alternative 
decisions.  To do so, we adopt the comparison methodology by evaluating the first-order 
derivatives 1 1
SV y   and 2 2SV y   in equations (3.9) at 1 2{ , },W Wy y  taking into account the FOCs 
for the fighting equilibrium in equations (3.5a) and (3.5b).  After re-arranging terms, we have 
2
1 2
( , )
( , )
0
2
i
W W
i
W WS
yi
i y y
D y yV
y
    for 1,2.i        (3.10) 
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The derivatives in (3.10) are unambiguously positive because iD  ( 1, 2i  ) is strictly positive 
according to Assumption 3.3.  Given that each party’s expected payoff function SiV  is strictly 
concave in iy , we infer that 
.S Wi iy y           (3.11a) 
Equation (3.11a) indicates that each party’s optimal combative input is relatively greater in the 
bargaining equilibrium than in the fighting equilibrium.   
The intuition behind the result in (3.11a) is as follows.  When the conflictual parties 
anticipate destruction to be avoided through bargaining, they have a strong incentive to allocate 
relatively more resources to gun allocations for guarding the settlement.  Given that 
1 2( , )
S S SQ f R y R y    and 1 2( , )W W WQ f R y R y    according to the production technology in 
Assumption 3.1, the finding that S Wi iy y  implies  
.S WQ Q           (3.11b) 
Equation (3.11b) indicates that, relative to the settlement bargaining, there are “gains from 
fighting” in terms of the consumable good produced, .W SQ Q  We thus have 
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Bargaining is costly). For conflict between two parties in which the 
overall destruction to the consumable good is endogenously increasing in their combative inputs, 
each party allocates more resources to combative inputs for guarding their settlement through 
bargaining than in the event of fighting.  As a result, the aggregate production of the consumable 
good is relatively lower in the bargaining equilibrium.  In terms of the consumable good 
produced which is contestable, there are gains from fighting. 
 Proposition 3.1 has an interesting implication for conflictual parties.  In terms of 
consumable resources forgone, settlement bargaining is costly under the threat of conflict.  
Preparing a lower level of arming under settlement (relative to the case of fighting) turns out to 
be “inefficient” and will only risk one’s capability in guarding a negotiated settlement.   
Two questions of interest naturally arise.  With the relatively higher levels of armaments, 
will the settlement bargaining constitute the dominant outcome in situations where property 
rights are imperfectly defined or enforced?  Will the conflictual parties ever choose to fight?  To 
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answer the questions, we employ the plausible assumption that each party’s choice between 
fighting and bargaining depends on the level of its expected payoff.  This is consistent with the 
rational choice theory of international relations that contending parties start a war intending to 
win.  Winning a war increases a party’s power and wealth which are captured by its expected 
payoff in our setting.   
The next step of the analysis is to compare their equilibrium expected payoffs between 
fighting and bargaining.  Before doing so, we discuss the following Lemma: 
LEMMA 3.1. Denote 1 2( , )
S S Sp y y  as party 1’s winning probability when the two parties 
negotiate for mutually acceptable shares (see equations (3.7a) and (3.7b)).  Denote 1 2( , )
W W Wp y y  
as party 1’s winning probability in the event of fighting without negotiations.  The assumption of 
symmetry in all aspects implies  that 1 2.S Wp p     
Applying Lemma 3.1 to WiV  in equation (3.4) and 
S
iV  in equation (3.6), we have  
1 2
1 ( , ) ( ) .
2
S W W W W S
i iV V D y y Q Q             (3.12a) 
Note that 1 2( , )
W WD y y  is the indirect cost of fighting for party i, measured by the scale   times 
the destruction to the consumable good.  Since gains from fighting, ,W SQ Q  are strictly 
positive (see equations (3.11b)), we are able to compare the expected payoffs between 
bargaining and fighting as follows: 
S W
i iV V  if and only if 1 2( , ) ,W W W SD y y Q Q        (3.12b) 
W S
i iV V  if and only if 1 2( , ) .W W W SD y y Q Q        (3.12c) 
Based on the necessary and sufficient conditions in (3.12), we have 
PROPOSITION 3.2 (To fight or not to fight). Other things being equal, settlement through 
bargaining is a Pareto-improving choice if, and only if, the total destructiveness of fighting, ,D  
is higher than its gains, .W SQ Q   Nevertheless, fighting is a Pareto-improving choice if, and 
only if, the total destructiveness of fighting is less than its gains.  In the later case, the perceived 
payoffs from fighting are strictly higher than those in settlement bargaining. 
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 Proposition 3.2 indicates that when gains from fighting exceed total destruction such that 
( ) ,W SQ Q D   the conflictual parties find it beneficial to go to war.  Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are 
graphical interpretations of the findings in the above two propositions.  Figure 3.1 contains three 
panels A, B, and C for the case in which bargaining dominates fighting.  In panel A, each party’s 
expected payoff curve under settlement ( SiV ) is lying to the right of its expected payoff curve in 
the event of fighting ( WiV ) according to equations (3.10) and (3.11a).  The slope of ,
S
iV  when 
evaluated at ,Wiy  is strictly positive as shown by point E.  The positivity of the slope is consistent 
with the finding that .S Wi iy y   Panel B shows the total destruction function of fighting, ,D  
which is convex in the combative inputs, .Wiy   Panel C shows the product curve of the 
consumable good, which is strictly concave in the productive inputs, ( ).i ix R y   
Given each party’s endowment constraint, the result that S Wi iy y  implies that .S Wi ix x   
This in turn implies that gains from fighting are positive ( 0).W SQ Q     It follows from panels 
B and C that fighting is more costly than bargaining since .W SD Q Q     This explains why 
bargaining is the preferred choice ( ).S Wi iV V  
 Figure 3.2 shows the case in which fighting dominates bargaining, i.e., .W Si iV V   This is 
because total destructiveness of fighting is lower than its gains, .W SD Q Q     As a result, 
fighting is the preferred choice ( W Si iV V ). 
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that there is a positive relationship between combative 
inputs (arms buildups) and “armed peace.”  In terms of resources allocated to combative inputs 
for appropriation, our model shows that it is always more costly to maintain a negotiated 
settlement (under the shadow of conflict) than in the event of fighting.  Despite the availability of 
an unbiased settlement for conflictual parties to resolve their disputes, there is no guarantee that 
fighting will not emerge.  The prospect of weapons’ destructiveness plays an important role in 
affecting the expected payoffs of the parties and their choices between fighting and bargaining.  
Allocating relatively small amounts of resources to arming unambiguously lower the capacities 
of the parties to guard their negotiated settlement once fighting breaks out.  This situation 
becomes more serious when the destructiveness of weapons becomes greater. 
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Figure 3.1 Bargaining Dominates   
 
 
In the context of military conflicts, it is important to identify the roles that weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) might play in affecting the decisions of contending parties between 
fighting and bargaining.  This is especially true when the scale of fighting’s destructiveness is 
endogenously increasing in resources allocated to the production of WMD.  The inequality 
conditions in equation (3.12b) can be used to reflect Schelling’s (1960) notion of mutually 
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assured destruction (MAD).  In his now classic work, Schelling contends that for effectively 
achieving mutual cooperation rather than mutual defection, it is necessary to introduce MAD.  
The underlying rationale is that each party has the capability to destroy the other in the event of 
war.  In the present analysis of conflict under endogenous and increasing destruction, we are able 
to show a case where the MAD size is optimally determined by adversaries to generate effective 
deterrence.  For the destructiveness of weapons such that 1 2( , ) ( ) ,
W W W SD y y Q Q    we have 
,S Wi iV V  implying that fighting is a Pareto-inferior or inefficient choice.  Schelling (2005), in 
explaining why “[w]e have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger,” 
clearly notes the following: “What nuclear weapons have been used for, effectively, successfully, 
for sixty years has not been on the battlefield nor on population targets: they have been used for 
influence.”  Our model of endogenous destruction and armed peace is consistent with Schelling’s 
idea of influence. 
Social researchers have devoted considerable effort to analyzing the causes of wars.  
Possible explanations of why war occurs include incomplete information, over-optimism, 
miscalculations, biased negotiations, bargaining failures, commitment problems, irrationality, or 
a long-term strategy of gaining dominance over one’s opponent.  This list of underlying 
conditions explains well many facets of open conflicts or armed confrontations.  From a different 
perspective, our findings in Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 offer a solution to the fundamental question 
about the general causes of wars, without relying on these conditions.  Costly war, international 
conflict, or fighting in general may emerge as a dominant choice over bargaining even under 
complete information without misperceptions.  The positive analysis suggests that the use of 
power does not necessarily lead to an outcome inferior to settlement through bargaining.  
Moreover, higher levels of armaments may not actually make the world more unsafe, depending 
on weapons’ destructiveness relative to the gun allocation differentials between bargaining and 
fighting. 
 2.5 Effects of an (Exogenous) Advancement in Destruction Technology 
One question of interest concerns how the equilibrium choice between fighting and 
bargaining is affected by a technical progress in destruction technology.  This is a complicated 
issue and should be examined in a more general framework.  Nevertheless, the simple model 
presented in this paper may offer a preliminary exploration for the question.  We consider the 
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case of an exogenous advancement in destruction technology which generates a larger scale of 
destructiveness, other things being equal.  This allows us to conduct the comparative statics of 
the destructiveness multiplier,  .   
Based on the analyses of fighting and bargaining discussed earlier, we show in appendix 
B.3 the following comparative-static derivatives with respect to :  
0,
W
iy

   0,
W
iV

   0,
S
iy

   and 0.
S
iV

   
Further, applying the Envelope Theorem to equation (3.12a) yields  
( ) 0.
S W
i iV V

    
Thus, when there is an exogenous increase in ,  the increase in each party’s expected payoff is 
higher in bargaining settlement than in the event of fighting.   
Suppose that initially fighting dominates bargaining such that .W Si iV V   Advancement in 
destruction technology as captured by an increase in   will make the expected payoff 
differentials, defined as ( ),W Si iV V  to become smaller.  When   increases up to the level 
beyond which ( )W Si iV V  becomes negative, we have .S Wi iV V   Consequently, bargaining 
settlement dominates fighting.  The likelihood that bargaining dominates fighting is positively 
related to the exogenous advancement in destruction technology.  These results permit us to 
construct the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 3.3 (How a war ends). When there is an exogenous increase in the scale of 
destructiveness, both contending parties allocate relatively less resources to the combative 
inputs whether they choose to fight or not to fight.  In equilibrium, each party’s expected payoff 
becomes larger for either decision.  Other things being equal, an exogenous advancement in 
destruction technology (in terms of fighting’s destructiveness) lowers the likelihood that two 
parties choose fight. 
The logic underlying the result is as follows.  An increase in the destructiveness of 
weapons unambiguously reduces the perceived payoffs in the event of armed confrontation.  
Accordingly, each party has a lower incentive to fight. 
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2 can now be used to illustrate the case of “how a war ends” in 
response to a change in destruction technology that leads to an increase in the scale of 
destructiveness to valuable resources.21   In such case, Figure 3.2 is associated with a low level of 
destructiveness such that fighting dominates bargaining.  When   increases, that is, from panel 
B’ to panel B, bargaining becomes the dominant strategy.  This implies that costly fighting is no 
longer the preferred choice and the adversaries find it better off to end their war. 
 2.6 An Illustrative Example 
It is instructive to use numerical examples to analyze and compare the equilibrium 
outcomes between fighting and bargaining.  As discussed in the previous sections, we are 
particularly interested in the coexistence of S Wi iy y  and ,W Si iV V  which suggest that fighting is 
a preferred choice over bargaining. 
 For the simplicity of calculations, we use the additive form of the CSF and an exponential 
destruction function:   
 11 2
1 2
( , ) yp y y
y y
   and 
1 2
1 2( , ) ,
y yD y y    
where   is a positive constant.  Under symmetry in endowments, we assume that the production 
function takes the simple form as: 1 2 1 2( , ) 2 .Q f R y R y R y y        Based on the conflict 
technology, destruction technology, and production technology assumed above, equations (3.4) 
and (3.8) of the baseline model imply that each party’s expected payoffs from fighting and 
bargaining are: 
 1 21 2
1 2
(2 ),y yW ii
yV R y y
y y
      
 
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
(2 ) .
2
y y
y yS i
i
yV R y y
y y


      
These specifications are consistent with Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3. 
                                                 
21 The use of nuclear weapons in WWII resulting from advancement in destruction technology may serve as an 
example. 
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 Assuming that 50,R   1.1,   and 1,   we solve numerically for the equilibrium 
combative inputs, quantities of the consumable good produced, and destruction to be 
 1 2 13.445,
W Wy y   1 2 17.701,S Sy y  8.512,W SQ Q   and 12.973.D   
It follows that S Wi iy y  and .W SD Q Q     The expected payoffs of the parties are calculated 
to be 1 2 30.069
W WV V   and 1 2 32.299,S SV V   which imply that .S Wi iV V    These results are 
consistent with the findings in equations (3.11b) and (3.12b).  Two parties allocate relatively 
more resources to combative inputs in settlement bargaining than in the event of fighting.  
Because the destructiveness of fighting is higher than its gains, bargaining turns out to be the 
preferred choice (see Proposition 3.2). 
Next, we assume that R  and   remain unchanged but the scale of destructiveness 
becomes as small as 0.01.    We solve for the equilibrium solutions to be 
 1 2 23.728,
W Wy y  1 2 24.722,S Sy y   1.988,W SQ Q   and 0.92115.D   
It follows that S Wi iy y  and .W SD Q Q     The expected payoffs of the parties are calculated to 
be 1 2 25.811
W WV V   and 1 2 25.278,S SV V   which imply that .W Si iV V  These results are 
consistent with the findings in equations (3.11a) and (3.12a).  Two parties continue to allocate 
more resources to combative inputs in settlement bargaining than in the event of fighting.  
Because the gains from fighting are greater than its destructiveness, fighting turns out to be the 
preferred choice (see Proposition 3.2).   
The above numerical examples show that both Wiy  and 
S
iy  decrease with , other things 
being equal.  Interestingly, we can use the examples to illustrate how a war ends when the scale 
of destructiveness changes from 0.01   to 1   (say, due to an exogenous advancement in 
military weapons and their destruction technology).  These results are consistent with the 
implications as shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, as well as the findings in Proposition 3.3. 
 3 Alternative Models of Conflict with Endogenous Destruction 
To further demonstrate the robustness of the model results in Section 2, we examine three 
different settings in terms of fighting’s destructiveness.  The first setting is when the proportion 
of valuable resources destroyed by war is proportional to the amounts of combative inputs 
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allocated by conflictual parties.  The second setting is when the amounts of destructions to the 
parties differ even though their combative inputs are equally effective in fighting.  The third 
setting is when destructions are party-specific but combative inputs have both the offensive 
effect of inflicting damage on a rival party and the defensive effect of reducing damage caused 
by fighting.  In each mode of the destruction technology, we wish to examine whether the 
parties’ combative input allocations are greater in settlement bargaining than in the event of 
fighting.  Moreover, we wish to analyze and compare their expected payoffs between fighting 
and bargaining.  
 3.1 Proportional Destruction 
Denote 1 2( , )y y  as the proportion of the consumable good that remains after fighting, 
where 0 1.    The proportion of the consumable good caused by fighting is then equal to 
(1 ).   The expected payoff functions of the parties in the event of fighting are: 
1 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ),
WV p y y f R y R y y y          (3.13a) 
  2 1 2 1 2 1 21 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).WV p y y f R y R y y y         (3.13b) 
Following Chang and Luo (2012), we assume that the proportional function 1 2( , )y y  has the 
properties according to  
ASSUMPTION 3.3.1. The portion of the consumable good that remains after fighting is a 
strictly concave function of combative input allocations such that for , 1, 2i j  , i j , 
 1 2( , ) 0,
iy
i
y y
y
  
2
1 2
2
( , ) 0,
i iy y
i
y y
y
  
2
1 2
1 2
( , ) 0,
i j j iy y y y
y y
y y
         (3.14) 
and 2( ) 0.
i i j j i jy y y y y y
      In addition, we have (0,0) 1.   
This assumption extends the models of conflict and settlement in Garfinkel and Skaperdas 
(2000) where the proportion of valuable resources that remain after war is assumed to be 
exogenously fixed. 
Based on the expected payoff functions in (3.13) and Assumption 3.3.1, the FOCs of the 
two parties are: 
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1 1 1
1
1
0
W
y x y
V p Q pf pQ
y
        and 2 2 2
2
2
(1 ) (1 ) 0.
W
y x y
V p Q p f p Q
y
           (3.15) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
W Wy y  as the optimal combative input allocations in the fighting equilibrium where 
the proportional function satisfies the FOCs in (3.15).  We show in Appendix B.4 that the SOCs 
are satisfied which ensure the strict concavity of WiV  in .
W
iy  
 For the bargaining equilibrium, it is easy to verify that the Nash Bargaining shares 
denoted as { ,1 },   of the consumable good for the two parties are: 
  1 (1 )
2
p      and 11 (1 ) (1 ).
2
p        
 In settlement bargaining under the shadow of conflict (due to the absence of  
enforcement), the two parties’ expected payoffs are: 
 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 ( , ) ,2SV p y y f R y R y y y f R y R y y y         (3.16a) 
   2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 211 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1 ( , ) .2SV p y y f R y R y y y f R y R y y y          (3.16b) 
The FOCs of the parties with respect to 1y  and 2y  are: 
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1
1 ( ) 0,
2
S
y x y x x y
V p Q pf pQ f f Q
y
                (3.17a) 
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
1(1 ) (1 ) ( ) 0.
2
S
y x y x x y
V p Q p f p Q f f Q
y
                 (3.17b) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
S Sy y  as the optimal combative input allocations in the bargaining equilibrium with 
the proportional function that satisfies the FOCs in (3.17).  We show in Appendix B.4 that the 
SOCs are satisfied which ensure the strict concavity of SiV  in .
S
iy  
 Next, given that WiV  and 
S
iV  are strictly concave, we evaluate the derivatives of 
S
iV  with 
respective to iy  at the war equilibrium gun allocations, 1 2{ , }.
W Wy y  Making use of equations 
(3.15) and (3.17), we have 
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1 21 2
{ , }{ , }
1 ( )
2 i i i W WW W
S
i
x x y
y yi y y
V f f Q
y
      for 1,2.i       (3.18) 
Define , i
W
i
f y W
i
yQ
y Q
    and 1 ,
(1 )
1i
W
i
y W
i
y
y
 
     as elasticities of production and destruction 
with respect to combative inputs.  It follows from equation (3.18) that  
1 2{ , }
0
W W
S
i
i y y
V
y
   if and only if , 1 , .i if y y      (3.19) 
For a one percent change in each party’s combative input, if the percentage change in destruction 
proportion is greater than the percentage change in production, we have ( ) 0
i i ix x y
f f Q     
such that the derivative in equation (3.18) is positive.  The strict concavity of  SiV  in 
S
iy  then 
implies that  
.S Wi iy y           (3.20) 
If follows from equation (3.20) and the production that 0.W SQ Q   This difference in the 
amounts of the consumable good produced measures gains from fighting.   
Under symmetry, we use equations (3.14) and (3.16) to compare the expected payoffs 
between fighting and bargaining.  We have  
   1 1 ,
2 2
W S W S
i iV V Q Q    
which is strictly positive if, and only if, 
(1 ).W S WQ Q Q             (3.21) 
Note that the right-hand side of equation (3.21) is the total destruction cost resulting from 
fighting.  This result is consistent with the finding as shown in equation (3.12b) of the baseline 
model.  We thus have 
PROPOSITION 3.4. Consider conflict between two symmetric parties where total destruction 
caused by fighting is proportional to their resources allocated combative inputs.  The parties 
allocate more resources to combative inputs in the bargaining equilibrium than in the fighting 
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equilibrium if, and only if, the use of combative inputs increases the proportional destruction 
more effective than the use of productive inputs in producing the consumable good.  In addition, 
fighting is a Pareto-improving choice over bargaining if, and only if, gains from fighting are 
greater than its total destruction. 
 3.2 Party-Specific Destruction 
Next, we examine the setting where total destructions to the conflictual parties differ in 
amounts.  Specifically, the expected payoffs with party-specific destructions are given as  
1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , );
WV p y y f R y R y D y y          (3.22a) 
  22 1 2 1 2 1 21 ( , ) ( , ) ( , );WV p y y f R y R y D y y          (3.22b) 
where 1 2( , )
iD y y  measures destruction specific to party i and ,  as defined earlier, is a 
destructiveness multiplier.  Similar to Assumption 3.3, we assume that iD  satisfies certain 
conditions as outlined in  
ASSUMPTION 3.3.2. Total destruction to a party is a convex and increasing function of the 
combative inputs 1y  and 2y  such that for , 1, 2i j  , i j , 
1 2( , ) 0,
i
i
i
y
i
D y yD
y
 
2
1 2
2
( , ) 0,
i i
i
i
y y
i
D y yD
y
 
2
1 2( , ) 0,
i j j i
i
i i
y y y y
i j
D y yD D
y y
      (3.23) 
and 0.
i i j j i j j i
i j i j
y y y y y y y yD D D D   
 Applying Assumption 3.3.2 to the expected payoff functions in (3.22), the FOCs of the 
two parties are: 
1 1 1
11
1
0
W
y x y
V p Q pf D
y
    

 and 
2 2 2
22
2
(1 ) 0.
W
y x y
V p Q p f D
y
      

  (3.24) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
W Wy y   as the optimal combative input allocations in the fighting equilibrium that 
satisfy the FOCs in (3.24).  We show in Appendix B.5 that the SOCs are satisfied which ensure 
the strict concavity of WiV  in .Wiy  
 It can easily be verified that when the two parties negotiate a settlement through 
bargaining, the shares of the consumables, denoted as { ,1 }    are: 
2 1( )
2
D Dp
Q
    and 
1 2( )1 1 .
2
D Dp
Q
          (3.25) 
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In settlement bargaining, the two parties’ expected payoffs are:  
1 2
1 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
[ ( , ) ( , )]( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,
2
S D y y D y yV p y y f R y R y D y y         (3.26a) 
  1 22 1 2 1 22 1 2 1 2 1 2 [ ( , ) ( , )]1 ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .2S
D y y D y yV p y y f R y R y D y y         (3.26b) 
It follows from equations (3.26) that the FOCs are: 
1 1
1 1 1
1 2
11
1
( )
0,
2
S
y y
y x y
D DV p Q pf D
y
      

           (3.27a) 
2 2
2 2 2
1 2
22
2
( )
(1 ) 0.
2
S
y y
y x y
D DV p Q p f D
y
        

    (3.27b) 
Denote 1 2{ , }
S Sy y   as the optimal combative input allocations in the bargaining equilibrium that 
satisfy the FOCs in (3.27).  We show in Appendix B.5 that the SOCs are satisfied which ensure 
the strict concavity of SiV  in Siy . 
 Next, evaluating the first-order derivatives of SiV  with respect to iy  in equations (3.27) at 
the war equilibrium combative input allocations 1 2{ , },
W Wy y   yields 
1 2 1 2
( , ) ( , )
( )
0
2
i i
W W W W
i jS
y yi
i y y y y
D DV
y
       

  for , 1, 2i j   and i j .   (3.28) 
The positive sign in equation (3.28) is due to the strict concavity of WiV  and ,SiV as well as the 
plausible assumptions that marginal destructions ( and i ji iD D ) are positive.  Given that each 
party’s expected payoff function SiV  is strictly concave in ,iy  we infer that 
.S Wi iy y            (3.29a) 
This further implies that  
.W SQ Q            (3.29b) 
 From equations (3.22) and (3.26), we find differences in expected payoffs between 
fighting and bargaining to be  
1
1 1 1 2( , );
W S W S W WV V pQ Q D y y               (3.30a) 
2
2 2 1 2(1 ) (1 ) ( , ).
W S W S W WV V p Q Q D y y                (3.30b) 
We show in the Appendix B.6 that equations (3.30) imply that    
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0W Si iV V    if, and only if,  1 21 2 1 2( , ) ( , ).W S W W W WQ Q D y y D y y         (3.31) 
Note that the term on the right-hand side of equation (3.31) is total destruction caused by 
fighting.  We therefore have 
PROPOSITION 3.5. For the circumstances in which the destructiveness of fighting is party-
specific, the findings of the baseline model continue to hold.  Both parties allocate more resource 
to combative inputs in settlement bargaining than in the event of fighting.  Fighting (bargaining) 
is a Pareto-improving choice if, and only if, the destruction costs are less (greater) than gains 
from fighting. 
 3.3 Preventive and Offensive Destructions 
Military weapons can fundamentally be classified into two broad categories: offensive 
and defensive.  Offensive weapons such as missiles are used to inflict destructions to an enemy 
in warfare.  Defensive weapons such as interceptor missiles are used for reducing damages by 
intercepting missiles from an enemy.  Based on these observations, we consider the third setting 
in which resources allocated to combative inputs produce weapons that serve the dual purposes 
of an offensive attack and a defensive protection. 
In the event of fighting, we assume that destructions have both the defensive and 
offensive components as summarized in  
ASSUMPTION 3.3.3. Destructions to party i  are decreasing in its combative input allocation 
but are increasing in the combative input allocation of its rival party own j  ( , 1, 2i j  , )i j  
such that the following conditions are satisfied: 
1 2( , ) 0,
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i
i
y
i
D y yD
y
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y
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D y yD
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2
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i i
i
i
y y
i
D y yD
y
    (3.32) 
   
2
1 2( , ) 0,
i j j i
i
i i
y y y y
i j
D y yD D
y y
     and 0.i i j j i j j i
i j i j
y y y y y y y yD D D D   
 Assumption 3.3.3 indicates that in the event of fighting, each party’s combative input is 
able to protect its own gains by lowering destruction and to inflict damages to its rival party.  
Furthermore, the marginal effect of a party’s defensive and offensive combative input is subject 
to diminishing with its rival’s combative input. 
68 
 
 Given equations (3.32) and Assumptions 3.3.3 and 3.3.2, the implications as shown by 
equations (3.24) to (3.31) continue to be valid except that the sign for the derivative in equation 
(3.28) is no longer positive.  Denote the optimal combative input allocation in the case of 
preventive and offensive destructions as 1 2ˆ ˆ{ , }
k ky y  for , .k W S   We have, for 1,2i   and i j , 
that  
 
1 2 1 2ˆ ˆ( , ) ˆ ˆ( , )
ˆ ( )
0
ˆ 2
i i
W W W W
i jS
y yi
i y y y y
D DV
y
     if and only if .i i
j i
y yD D  
This indicates that 1 1ˆ ˆ
S Wy y  if and only if combative inputs are more effective in attacking than 
in protecting.  In other words, if combative inputs have more success in lowering rivalry’s payoff 
as compared to keeping one’s payoff not being lowered, each party allocates more combative 
inputs in guarding its bargaining position.  We summarize the results in 
PROPOSITION 3.6. Consider the case where endogenous destructions resulting from fighting 
have the offensive and defensive components in that a party’s combative input lowers its own 
damages but increases damages to its rival.  The two parties allocate more resources to 
combative inputs in the event of fighting than in settlement bargaining if, and only if, their 
combative inputs are more effective offensively (in increasing destructions to their rivals) than 
defensively (in reducing destructions to their own).  Under these circumstances, fighting is a 
Pareto-improving choice if, and only if, the destruction costs are less than gains from fighting.  
But if the destruction costs are greater than gains from fighting, bargaining is a Pareto-
improving choice.  
 4 Concluding Remarks 
This paper contributes to the theoretical conflict literature by presenting a general 
equilibrium model that explicitly characterizes how conflict technology, production technology, 
and destruction technology interact in determining the equilibrium choice between fighting and 
bargaining.  We make no attempts to explain real wars in history.  Rather, our aim is to present 
an economic approach to examining the determinants of incentives for conflictual parties to 
engage in bargaining and settlement when they wish to avoid costly and destructive fighting.  
Under the shadow of conflict, bargaining is shown to be costly.  We find that a party’s decision 
to bargain or to fight depends crucially on the endogeneity of weapons’ destructiveness, an 
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important aspect that has not been adequately analyzed in the theoretical conflict literature.  We 
show conditions under which fighting constitutes a Nash equilibrium choice and Pareto 
dominates bargaining, without the conditions of incomplete information, miscalculations, biased 
negotiations, or irrationality.  This result stands in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom 
that costly fighting is an inferior outcome than bargaining.  The general equilibrium model of 
conflict with endogenously increasing destruction shows an economic approach to resolving the 
long-standing puzzle of war’s inefficiency. 
We find that, irrespective of the equilibrium outcome, resources allocated to combative 
inputs for guarding negotiated shares of a contested property are strictly greater in settlement 
bargaining than in the event of fighting.  When the endogenously determined destruction costs 
exceed gains from fighting, each party’s expected payoff under settlement is relatively higher.  
As a consequence, bargaining is a dominant choice over fighting.  For achieving a mutually 
acceptable settlement, each party finds it optimal to better its bargaining position by increasing 
arming relative to that in the event of fighting.  Ironically, potential benefits from avoiding the 
breakout of a war are higher the more severe the destructiveness of fighting, ceteris paribus.  
Under the shadow of conflict with endogenously increasing destruction, increasing armaments is 
not inconsistent with negotiating a settlement.  The positive analysis of fighting and bargaining 
has an interesting implication for armed peace. 22   This result contrasts with the idealist 
perspective that an effective bargaining and settlement requires arms reductions.  Quite to the 
contrary, mutually acceptable bargaining settlements may not be effectively maintained unless 
there are sufficient amounts of armaments. 
Furthermore, the positive analysis with this paper offers an explanation of how a war 
ends.  We find that if there is an advance in technology which makes combative inputs more 
destructive, conflictual parties find it optimal to allocate less resource to combative inputs for 
both fighting and bargaining.  Each party’s expected payoff becomes larger, but the payoff of 
bargaining increases faster than the payoff of fighting.  These results imply that, all else being 
                                                 
22 Chassang and Miquel (2010) present an interesting model of conflict to characterize the role that predatory and 
preemptive incentives play in determining the sustainability of peace.  Under complete information, symmetric 
increases in weapons are shown to foster peace since expected payoffs from conflict diminish.  But under 
incomplete information or strategic risk, symmetric increases in weapons may be destabilizing since contending 
parties may increase their preemptive incentives.  Chassang and Miquel (2010) further show that very large stocks 
of weapons may facilitate peace under strategic risk and asymmetry in military strength. 
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unchanged, an exogenous increase in the scale of destructiveness associated with combative 
inputs reduces the likelihood that the adversaries choose to fight.  Finally, the extensions of the 
baseline model to include other types of destruction function show the robustness of the 
aforementioned results. 
Some caveats about the analysis with this paper, and hence the potentially interesting 
extensions of the simple model, should be mentioned.  First, we do not allow for the possibility 
of asymmetry in information structure.  Although former researchers have shown that fighting or 
war is more likely to emerge under incomplete information, endogenous destruction may change 
the incentive structure of the adversaries in choosing between production and appropriation.  
Second, we do not examine the effect of third party interventions.  Third-party interventions may 
or may not eliminate conflict between two rival parties.23  It might be instructive to see how the 
endogeneity of weapons’ destructiveness would affect an outside party’s incentives to intervene, 
as well as the duration and outcome of the conflict.  Third, a possible extension is to allow for 
continuous fighting and examine how conflict persistence affects the decisions of the parties on 
allocating resources to combative inputs in a dynamic setting.  The present analysis also abstracts 
from the possibility that the contending parties may undertake military R&D to enhance their 
likelihoods of wining or to improve their bargaining positions.  These issues may constitute 
interesting topics for future research. 
                                                 
23 See, for example, Regan (1998, 2002), Rowlands and Carment (2006). Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007), Chang, 
Potter, and Sanders (2007b), Chang and Sanders (2009), and Chang, Sanders, and Walia (2010), and Chang and Luo 
(2011). 
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Appendix A - Appendix of Chapter 1 
Table A.1 List of Countries 
Argentina El Salvador Malawi Russian Federation 
Australia Estonia Malaysia Senegal 
Austria Finland Malta Singapore 
Bangladesh France Mauritius Slovenia 
Belarus Germany Mexico South Africa 
Bolivia Ghana Moldova Spain 
Brazil Greece Morocco Sri Lanka 
Bulgaria Guatemala Netherlands Sweden 
Cambodia Guyana New Zealand Switzerland 
Cameroon Hong Kong Norway Tunisia 
Canada India P. R. China Turkey 
Chile Indonesia Pakistan United Kingdom 
Colombia Ireland Panama United States 
Costa Rica Israel Paraguay Uruguay 
Cyprus Italy Peru Venezuela 
Czech Republic Japan Philippines Zambia 
Denmark Kenya Poland Zimbabwe 
Dominica Lithuania Republic Of Korea
Ecuador Macedonia Romania   
 
 
Table A.2 Percentage of World Trade with Sample Countries 
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports 
1993 85.24% 85.55% 2002 85.99% 85.18% 
1994 85.60% 86.10% 2003 85.92% 84.76% 
1995 85.48% 86.17% 2004 85.48% 84.07% 
1996 85.52% 85.85% 2005 85.21% 83.05% 
1997 85.92% 85.89% 2006 85.05% 82.19% 
1998 86.23% 86.98% 2007 84.52% 82.26% 
1999 86.89% 86.71% 2008 83.71% 81.02% 
2000 86.97% 85.20% 2009 83.16% 82.35% 
2001 86.50% 85.04%  
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Table A.3 Trade Deficit of US from Trade with China 
Year Trade from China to US Trade from US to China Deficit Difference Growth Rate (%) 
1993 16976.5 8767.1 8209.4 
1994 21421.4 9286.9 12134.5 3925.1 47.81 
1995 24743.9 11748.5 12995.4 860.9 7.09 
1996 26730.6 11977.9 14752.7 1757.3 13.52 
1997 32743.9 12805.4 19938.5 5185.8 35.15 
1998 38000.6 14258 23742.6 3804.1 19.08 
1999 42003.1 12943.6 29059.5 5316.9 22.39 
2000 52161.7 15963.7 36198 7138.5 24.57 
2001 54395.1 19234.9 35160.2 -1037.8 -2.87 
2002 70063.8 22052.7 48011.1 12850.9 36.55 
2003 92633.2 28418.5 64214.7 16203.6 33.75 
2004 125181 34721 90460 26245.3 40.87 
2005 163348 41836.7 121511.3 31051.3 34.33 
2006 203898 55224 148674 27162.7 22.35 
2007 233181 65238.4 167942.6 19268.6 12.96 
2008 252786 71457 181329 13386.4 7.97 
2009 221384 69576 151808 -29521 -16.28 
Mean 21.20 
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Appendix B - Appendix of Chapter 3 
 B.1 The equivalence of Nash bargaining and the split-the-surplus rule 
To solve for ,  we take the first-order derivative of the Nash product 
1 1 2 2( )( ),
S W S WV V V V   as defined in equations (3.4) and (3.6), with respect to   and set it to zero.  
This yields 
    (1 ) (1 )( ) ( ) 0.Q Q p Q D Q Q p Q D            
Canceling out Q  and solving for ,  we have 
 (2 1) .
2
p Dp
Q
    
 Next we consider the split-the-surplus rule (see, e.g., Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000)).  
This rule guarantees that the equilibrium gains in payoffs (which may be referred to as “peace 
dividends”) are equalized across the two parties when negotiating a settlement.  That is,  
 1 1 2 2 .
S W S WV V V V    
Substituting the expected payoffs from equations (3.4) and (3.6) into the above equality, we have  
 ( ) (1 ) (1 )( ).Q p Q D Q p Q D           
Solving for   yields 
 (2 1) .
2
p Dp
Q
    
 B.2 SOCs and the Jacobian determinants of the baseline model 
In the event of fighting, the SOCs of the expected payoff maximization problems for the 
two parties are strictly negative according to Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1
2
1
( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 0;
W
y y y x y x x y y
V p Q D p f D p f D
y
           
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2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2
2
( ) 2 ( ) (1 )( ) 0.
W
y y y y x y x x y y
V p Q D p f D p f D
y
             
Under symmetry, the Jacobian determinant of the FOCs for the two parties in the fighting 
equilibrium is: 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1
.
W W W W
W V V V VJ
y y y y y y
                        
 
Making use of equations (3.5), we have 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 21 1
2 2[ ( ) 2 ( ) ( )] [ ( )] .
W
y y y x y x x y y x x y yJ p Q D p f D f D f D            (b.1) 
Rewriting (b.1) yields 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2
1
2
1
1
2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
.
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
y y y x y x x x x y y y yW
y y y x y x x x x y y y y
p Q D p f D f f D D
J
p Q D p f D f f D D
   
    
               
 (b.2) 
According to Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3, both the numerator and the denominator of equation (b.2) 
are negative.  This implies that 0WJ  . 
 In settlement bargaining, under symmetry, i.e., 1 2
S Sy y  and 1 1 2p p   , we have 
from equations (3.9) the SOCs of the two parties: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1
22
1
( ) 2 ( ) 0;
S
y y y x y x x
y p Q D p f D f
y
         
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 1
22
2
( ) 2 ( ) 0.
S
y y y x y x x
y p Q D p f D f
y
          
They are strictly negative according to Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3.  The Jacobian determinant of the 
FOCs for the two parties in the bargaining equilibrium is 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1
.
S S S S
S V V V VJ
y y y y y y
                        
 
Making use of equations (3.9) and (3.10), we have  
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2
2 2
1 1
2 2( ) 2 ( ) .
S
y y y x y x x x x y yJ p Q D p f D f f p D                 (b.3a) 
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Rewriting (b.3a) yields 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1
2 2
1
1 1
2 2
( ) 2
.
( ) 2 3
y y y x y y x x x xS
y y y x y y x x x x
p Q D p f p D f f
J
p Q D p f p D f f
 
  
           
   (b.3b) 
According to Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3, both the numerator and the denominator of equation (b.3b) 
are negative.  This implies that 0SJ  . 
 B.3 Comparative statics of a change in destructiveness multiplier 
Taking the total differentiation of the FOCs in (3.5) yields 
 1 1
2 2
2 2
1 1
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12 2
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.
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                            
 
Solving for 1
Wdy d , taking into account that 1 2W Wdy d dy d  , we have 
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1
2[ ( ) 2 ( ) ( )].
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p D pDdy p Q D p f D f f D D
d H
   
         
 Based on Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3 and the fact that 0,WH   we have 0.Widy d   This 
further implies that 0.WidV d   
Taking the total differentiation of the FOCs in (3.9) yields 
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                           
   
Solving for 1 ,
Sdy d  taking into account that 1 2S Sdy d dy d  , we have 
 1
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 Based on Assumptions 3.1 to 3.3 and the fact that 0SH  , we have 0Sidy d  .  As a 
result, 0SidV d  . 
 B.4 SOCs of the proportional destruction model 
In the event of fighting, the SOCs of the two parties for the case of proportional 
destruction are: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
1
2
1
2 2 2 0;
W
y y x x y y y x y y x y
V p Q pf pQ p f p Q pf
y
               (b.4) 
 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2
2
(1 ) (1 ) 2 2 2 0.
W
y y x x y y y x y y x y
V p Q p f p Q p f p Q pf
y
                (b.5) 
Note that in (b.4), the last two terms can be written as 
1
22 ypQ  according to the FOCs in 
equation (3.16).  The second-order derivatives in (b.4) and (b.5) are strictly negative according to 
Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.1. 
 In settlement bargaining, the SOCs of the two parties for the case of proportional 
destruction are: 
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 B.5 SOCs of the model with destructions to specific parties 
In the event of fighting, the SOCs of the two parties for the case of party-specific 
destructions are:      
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These second-order derivatives are strictly negative according to Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 
3.3.2. 
 In settlement bargaining, the SOCs of the parties for the case of party-specific 
destructions are satisfied since  
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 B.6 Necessary and sufficient conditions for the model with destructions to 
specific parties 
It follows from equations (3.30) that  
1 1 0
W SV V    if and only if 1 1 2( , );W S W WpQ Q D y y       
2 2 0
W SV V    if and only if 2 1 2( , ).W S W S W WpQ Q Q Q D y y         
That is,  
0W Si iV V    if and only if 1 21 2 1 2( , ) ( , ).W W W S W S W WD y y pQ Q Q Q D y y              
After re-arranging terms, we have conditions in (3.31). 
